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ABSTRACT 
The International Context of Central European Countries Participation  
in the Afghan Stabilization Mission 
Bartosz Kaluga 
 
The Afghan stabilization mission is a new challenge for Central European countries in the XXI century, 
and probably the most important and the most difficult mission for Central European armed forces. 
The fundamental role of NATO in Central European countries’ security results from basic strategic 
documents related to common defense. Strengthening NATO, in short, strengthens Central European 
countries’ security. In addition, the Afghanistan mission provides an invaluable experience for Central 
European armed forces. 
The findings of this study shows that although the Visegrad countries’ troop contribution lagged in 
the early phase of the ISAF mission, with the passing of time they have shared fairly the burden of 
responsibilities in Afghanistan. Moreover, Visegrad countries did not deploy forces to Afghanistan 
only because of allied obligations but also because of national interest and pragmatic reasons. Such 
considerable contributions by the Visegrad countries come from their aspiration to authenticate their 
reputation as a reliable allies. However, this research indicates that  Visegrad countries’ investment 
of troops and money did not translate into change of relations with the USA in particularly sensitive 
areas, as expected by Central European governments. 
The new generation of Central European citizens and politicians do not seem to be anti-American, 
but there is a growing sense that Visegrad countries, especially the largest member - Poland, went 
too far in supporting Washington’s foreign policy. The major reason for the reassessment of the 
Polish – American relationship is Warsaw’s heightened self-reliance as a member of the European 
Union, and awareness that now the most pivotal issues are negotiated in Brussels. Another 
explanation is that Warsaw is mindful that being one of the most devoted US allies in Europe has 
brought more disadvantages than advantages. Therefore, it seems that Americans should slowly get 
used to the inevitable day when Poland and other Central European countries will oppose 
Washington’s political, economic or military projects. And it will not be associated to Central 
European resentment towards Washington’s foreign policy, but a sign of the times of independence 
and maturity of the Visegrad countries in international politics. 
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In our globalized world there are some events which unite all people no matter what they believe. 
The September 11 was one of these days when probably hundreds of millions people around the 
world felt like Americans. In any case for current American generations beyond a doubt the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 became a “day of infamy”.1 In a similar way like the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, it 
was a day that all Americans will remember what they did and where they were when they heard 
about the events of that September day. If I could retrace in my mind the sequence of events that 
day, I would be able to reconstruct what I did exactly on 9/11 2001, though perhaps not at the very 
moment when American Airlines flights 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center 
or when American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. Nevertheless, I will not probably 
exaggerate if I say that the September 11 was the event which for the first time in my life forced me 
to reflect deeply on the worldwide political implications, not only for the United States but also for 
Europe and my home country of Poland – a recent member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.   
 
I was born in the late 1980s, too late to experience personally the epic struggle of Solidarity for 
freedom in Poland and latter the Soviet bloc collapse. The 1999 Central European Countries’ 
accession to NATO fundamentally changed regional security, but it had not influenced my personal 
consciousness in comparison with the approaching European Union extension to the East in 2004. 
Thus, up until as late as the September 11, 2001 I had never experienced any event which raised my 
political awareness and made me aware of international importance and context as did the terrorists 
attacks of that day. September 11 automatically acquired a symbolic meaning. From an analytical 
point of view to some scholars this date determined a new age in international relations; meanwhile 
others acknowledged it as the first act in a global civil war.2 Indeed, the terrorist attacks on the 
United States - until that time recognized as a country unbeatable and untouchable at least on home 
ground – shocked the world and shattered the global order on the verge of new century.3 Soon the 
                                                           
1 James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process. Fourth Edition (Iowa State University: Thomson 
Wadsworth, 2005), 213. 
2 Roman Kuźniar, Polityka i Siła. Studia Strategiczne – Zarys Problematyki (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
Scholar, 2005), 280. 
3
 In this sense, especially for the US, the events of September 11 have had a more profound effect on 
theoretical and policy approaches to foreign affairs than other previous spectacular event (for example Pearl 
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debate on worldwide terrorism engulfed western security experts, who acknowledged this 
watershed phenomenon as the most serious threat to international security in contemporary times.4 
 
In addition to worldwide terrorism, several features of the present era present a greater risk to 
global security than in recent decades. The most important tendency of the contemporary world is 
the steadily growing correlation between countries and regions in all pivotal aspects of life – a 
phenomenon which occurring in one region finds direct or indirect resonance in other parts of the 
world. It is a fact that technological progress in the communication and transportation field allows 
for the fast and relatively easy flow of information, capital, goods and people. Moreover we can 
observe enormous transformation in the development of weapons of mass destruction. The threat of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons has become more real as a consequence. Accessibility to modern 
weaponry is not only available to countries with rational political systems, but also to those whose 
actions are unpredictable and difficult to control. Additionally, these countries are located in crucial 
world strategic regions. And finally, terrorist organizations which can take control of weak states – 
although  some of them use terrorists for own purposes – can obtain easier accessibility to the 
above-mentioned means of mass destruction and portable nuclear fuses as well. All of these factors 
describe the character of contemporary threats to humankind.5 
 
Another important aspect of the contemporary world order is the fact that any single country, 
regardless of its size or wealth, is unable to manage independently the problems mentioned above. 
In the same way, no worldwide system constructed on the pattern of the national-state, will be able 
to manage issues with the roots springing from the present degree of globalization or the difficulties 
caused by this incompatibility. Constant and intensive cooperation of countries and supranational 
institutions is desired to undertake such tasks. Global order, in all mentioned above fields, has 
become a global public good: if its “production” and “supply” are provided everybody gains, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Harbor, the Vietnam War, or the fall of the Berlin Wall). Indeed, the subplots of 9/11 have been clearly 
evidenced in American society’s attitudes toward foreign affairs, increased support within Congress for foreign 
policy initiatives and the altered type of the presidency itself - which will be examined in the first chapter. See 
also: James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process, 214. 
4
 Roman Kuźniar. Polityka i Siła, 280. 
5 Antoni Z. Kamiński, ed.,  Polityka Bez Strategii. Bezpieczeństwo Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej i Polski w 
Perspektywie Ładu Globalnego (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2008), 34. 
   
 
3 
irrespective of incurred expenditures; if it is not like that – everyone will by necessity lose.6 The 
perfect example is the case of the Afghan war, where American difficulties to bring the situation 
under control compel United States to give the operation a multilateral framework. 
 
The Afghan War was related to the tragic events of September 2001, which had forced the United 
States to launch the operation Enduring Freedom and to form the international antiterrorist coalition 
aiming to overthrow the Taliban regime while simultaneously lifting the protective umbrella created 
by the Afghan state for international terrorist organizations – headed by Al-Qaeda. The defeat of the 
Taliban regime, from the beginning highly deceptive, allowed the international community to 
undertake the reconstruction and rebuilding of an Afghan state, carried out mainly by International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Operation ISAF, basically the fundamental subject of this thesis, was 
initiated at the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002. As a part of this operation, member countries 
mainly undertake stabilization tasks designed to support Afghan authorities in rebuilding state-run 
institutions, armed forces and police, and the expansion of central state authority over the whole 
Afghan territory. In the beginning the operation was commanded by individual countries, starting 
with Great Britain (ISAF-I) and Turkey (ISAF-II), followed by the joint command of Germany and 
Holland (ISAF-III). On the strength of the NATO Council decision of April 16, 2004 command of the 
ISAF operation was taken over by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The activities of the USA 
and NATO’s operations have been coordinated with visible efforts to merge them further. The 
growing importance of stabilization activities as a part of ISAF results from demands coming from the 
Enduring Freedom operation.7 Similarly, along with the growing importance of the multinational 
operations and stabilization tasks, the demands placed on participating members have grown in 
parallel fashion. 
 
Ten years after the terrorists attacks on the United States thousands of publications have appeared 
in direct reference to the 9/11 terrorist attacks themselves and thousands more about the 
implications of this landmark event for the global order, internal and foreign policy approaches, as 
well as political outcomes for individual states. Focusing particularly on the issue of the Afghan war 
and latter stabilization mission, the majority of scholars have concentrated on the role of the United 
States – its counterterrorism operations and rooting out Al-Qaeda and the Taliban – and on NATO’s 
                                                           
6
 Antoni Z. Kamiński, Polityka Bez Strategii, 41. 
7
Bogusław Winid, Udział Polski w Działaniach Stabilizacyjnych (Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych, Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, nr 1 (35), 15 stycznia 2007), 5-6. 
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mission, attentive to its peacekeeping operations and reconstruction tasks. Probing more deeply into 
the scope of research in that field, we can find papers analyzing the tangled web of Afghan historical 
circumstances (which have had an impact on failed American attempts to established a safe and 
democratic Afghanistan), highlighting the problems of making common USA-NATO strategy for 
winning in Afghanistan, or emphasizing the role of particular countries. Nevertheless, however 
widely scholars have analyzed the issue of the Afghan stabilization mission and whatever approach 
they took in doing so, the nature and context of Central European countries’ commitment to this 
mission is one major gap in the literature. Thus, the point of departure of my research will be the 
examination of the Afghan stabilization mission from a different and neglected perspective, one that 
places the emphasis on the international context of the Afghan stabilization mission and the role of 
the Central European Countries within that context. Furthermore, I will also examine what has 
changed through the first decade of the XXI century in the special relationship between the United 
States and Central European countries as a result.   
 
Central Europe is a part of the global order, but its role in the international system is no more than 
secondary. Even the term “Central Europe” or “East-Central Europe” creates reservations among 
both scholars and non-scholars.8 The term “Central Europe” first appeared during the Enlightenment 
and became very popular at the turn of the XIX/XX century with the development of geopolitical 
ideas and the political-economic expansionist agendas of German-speaking imperial elites.9 Central 
Europe or East-Central Europe can be examined from several perspectives but neither term implies 
homogeneous integrity. Various authors have proposed disparate classifications of the constituent 
countries. Depending on the criteria used, East-Central Europe consists from four (Visegrad Group: 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary) to seventeen countries.10 Nevertheless, there is no 
precise definition of Central-Eastern Europe; all are arbitrary, and it is not my aim to explore that 
subject at greater depth.11 Thus for my purposes, I will focus only on these countries which are 
contained in every classification – the Visegrad Group countries (V4). I chose to examine these 
                                                           
8
 Antoni Z. Kamiński, Polityka Bez Strategii, 7. 
9
 It is worth stressing that in German version this term articulated political-economy imperial aspirations, 
meanwhile Habsburg interpretation concerned mainly cultural uniqueness of Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
characterized by mosaic of ethnic groups and religious dominations. In: Antoni Z. Kamiński, Polityka Bez 
Strategii, 15. 
10
 Ibid., 17. 
11
 Ibid., 19. 
   
 
5 
countries for a number of reasons. First, three of the four member countries of the V4 group were 
included in the first NATO enlargement (Slovakia in the third). Therefore the ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan has become a test of their loyalty and usefulness for the activities undertaken by NATO. 
Second, they have been among the most visible supporters of the United States in the Europe. As a 
result they are more willing to support American foreign policy approaches and it is worthwhile to 
examine how and why they followed the United States into Afghanistan. Third, these countries 
learned lessons from past experiences and their transformation success, and although they still 
support the United States, they step into the XXI century with a more pragmatic approach to foreign 
affairs and relations with the Washington. This change of attitude of Visegrad group member 
countries toward the Transatlantic agenda demonstrates that the ISAF mission has had a significant 
impact on their relations with the United States. 
 
The beginning of the final decade of the 20th century presented Central European countries with a 
new geopolitical situation (Russia’s withdrawal from direct political-military dominance over the 
region and a change in relations with the West).  The western border ceased to be a threat and 
became a border of opportunity, which had a geopolitical and civilizational dimensions as well. 
Central European countries now had the chance to make good use of this new situation. The most 
beneficial means to that end was to attain NATO and EU membership. This was the common area of 
interest which united the region.12 
 
The Visegrad member countries, by acceding to NATO and likewise the European Union, have partly 
waived their traditionally acknowledged sovereignty. NATO membership makes their defense policy 
dependent on the North Atlantic Alliance policy as a whole, and a threat to the security of any of it 
members has to be treated as a threat to their own security.13 From the point of view of East-Central 
European region as a whole, the maintenance of the contemporary world order involves not only the 
lack of alternatives (considered to be chaos), but also the fact that the dawn of that order changed 
completely the regional political-economic situation by opening the perspective of civilizational 
advance. The borderland situation of East-Central Europe (between two major European countries – 
                                                           
12
 To achieve that plans came for example into existence Visegrad Group and Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA). In: Antoni Z. Kamiński, Polityka Bez Strategii, 20. 
13
 Ibid., 9. 
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Germany and Russia), which is to say high risk of external threats, particularly sensitized East-Central 
European countries to the significance of maintaining the status quo.14 
 
However, the problem is that European security and defense system effectiveness still depends on 
the Unites States’ participation. Europe stands in the face of a fundamental dilemma concerning the 
relationship between the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and NATO, consequently 
future relations between the EU and United States, as well as the future of NATO. Solving these 
problems depends not only on Washington’s policy and those of European countries and the 
European Union as a whole, but as well on the sort of threats confronting the West.15 One of the 
greatest threats, that posed by Islamic fundamentalist forces antagonistic to Western civilization, do 
not constitute a majority in the world of the Islamic civilization. However, they are an active minority, 
well organized and, in favorable circumstances able to destabilize countries from that cultural area. 
Thus, this factor is seriously treated in larger analyses of world security, including the security of the 
Central-Eastern European region.16 
 
The Afghan stabilization mission is a new challenge for Central European countries in the XXI century, 
and probably the most important and the most difficult mission for Central European armed forces. 
Therefore,  I will examine the CEC’s (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) real motives for 
participation in the Afghan stabilization mission. It is clear that is in the interest of Central European 
countries to strengthen the Alliance and participate in the constant validation of its political and 
military credibility. The fundamental role of NATO in Central European countries’ security results 
from basic strategic documents related to common defense. Strengthening NATO, in short, 
strengthens Central European countries’ security. Immediately, however, one question that suggests 
itself is whether in fact national interest or rather alliance obligations forced CEC governments to sent 
troops to the unstable and risky Afghan environment? In addition, the Afghanistan mission provides 
an invaluable experience for Central European armed forces. Central European perceptions of the 
prestige and importance of the alliance implies their active participation in international missions 
conducted by NATO. Central European countries cannot claim from the North Atlantic Alliance costly 
investments or seek to deploy its bases on their territory and at the same time say that their armies 
                                                           
14
 Ibid., 42. 
15
 Ibid., 31. 
16
 Ibid., 90. 
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and soldiers will remain in their barracks. Central European countries (especially Poland) want to be 
present as major actors of the stabilization mission in Afghanistan. Consequently another question 
arises in relation to the CEC members’ active participation in the mission – whatever tasks were 
assigned to CEC, have they been carried out  successfully? Secondly, whatever ambitious goals CEC set 
for itself, did they achieve any rewards for good performance? The success of the operation will 
confirm the credibility and strengthen the cohesiveness of the Alliance. The failure of the NATO-led 
ISAF mission would weaken the Alliance, and de facto, one of the pillars of Central European 
security.17 Not to mention that CEC’s performance on Afghan soil has direct implications for their 
relations with the United States and the so-called special relationship between Washington and this 
particular area of the world. 
 
Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning what this paper is not about. I do not seek to explain here 
what are the biggest obstacles to accomplishing this mission, nor do propose solutions for a new 
approach that will overcome these difficulties and succeed in Afghanistan. Although these issues will 
be explored in this paper, I designed this project to explain the complexity of V4 countries 
participation within the international context. Thus, this paper proceeds as follows. First, I will focus 
on the ISAF mission itself – its aims and tasks. Further, the first chapter explores American foreign 
policy toward Afghanistan and the Central European context. As I already mentioned, September 11, 
2001 had a powerful impact on the American foreign policy approach. Thus, I will place an emphasis 
in this chapter on the “Bush Doctrine”, perceived by some scholars as a considerable shift in 
American foreign policy, while others sees it as a continuation of policy but with more powerful 
tools, shaped by the 9/11 event. Having in mind current problems with the Afghan stabilization 
mission, my aim in this chapter is also to examine American misjudgments which led to the 
treatment of Afghanistan as a secondary priority. Potentially, it would have been much easier to get 
the situation in Afghanistan under control directly after the Taliban regime had been removed and 
had America’s involvement in Iraq not have been so considerable. Moreover, it goes hand in hand 
with problems of sharing responsibility for a common strategy for winning in Afghanistan which is 
fundamental to an understanding of the complexity of the international context of the mission. 
Finally, I will try to demonstrate the difference in approaches to the Afghanistan stabilization mission 
between the Bush to Obama administrations and of their expectations of the CEC’s contribution to 
the mission. 
                                                           
17
 Bogusław Winid, Udział Polski w Działaniach Stabilizacyjnych, s. 10. 




The second chapter examines Central European countries’ engagement in the Afghan stabilization 
mission. The first thing which has to be explored is an answer to the essential question – why, how 
and when V4 countries found themselves on Afghan soil. Giving detailed analysis of the specifics of 
the security conditions of Central European countries, I will be able to go over the expectations of the 
CEC in relation to their participation in the mission. Afterwards I will focus on the V4 countries 
contribution to the mission – their tasks within it and how have they changed with the passing of 
time.  
 
The third chapter concentrates on the experiences of V4 members in the Afghan mission. Basically, I 
will examine the significance of the CEC contribution to the ISAF mission in cooperation with other 
members of the coalition. Furthermore, I would like to look carefully what CEC have gained from 
their contribution to the ISAF operation and cross-examine it from two perspectives. Firstly, I will try 
to examine how their performance was evaluated by NATO and the USA and how they were rooted 
in NATO structures. Secondly, I will try to confront this data with the evaluation of their performance 
in their home countries, which together will allow me to state the advantages and disadvantages of 
their active/inactive involvement in the Afghan stabilization mission. Moreover, the final part of this 
chapter will be dedicated to an examination of the development of relations between the U.S. and 
V4 countries during the whole period of their commitment to the ISAF mission.  
 
The closing part contains conclusions and predictions concerning the CEC participation in the mission. 
I will try to give an assessment of the extent to which Central European expectations have been 
satisfied or not. Hopefully, after giving detailed answers to all these complex research questions, I 
will be able to scrutinize if it is still worthwhile for V4 to remain in Afghanistan, or whether it is too 
great  a challenge which does not compensate for their invested effort. 
In Poland, in contrast of other Visegrad group members, the Afghan stabilization mission enjoys a 
wide range of interest and has a broad bibliography. Moreover, the Polish case had been more 
widely described not only in Polish literature, but also in English publications. Thus the main obstacle 
which I notoriously kept encountering was the lack of sources in relation to the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary’s participation to the ISAF mission. Another stumbling block became my lack of 
knowledge of Central European languages, other than Polish, which did not allow me to make use of 
native publications of the other Visegrad group member countries. Nevertheless, in this study, I was 
able to manage these disadvantages by using both traditional and internet sources. While searching 
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for information on the Internet, I tried to obtain all useful data about the ISAF mission and then by 
selective examination of that data, provide detailed information about particular V4 member country 
involvement in the operation. I was able to gain access to useful articles, reports and analyses by 
following and searching through all available TV channels, radio programs or internet websites 
devoted to the Afghan conflict. American and European think tank publications were extremely 
helpful in finding the most important data, hypotheses or trends occurring in the body of Afghan 
research. The study also makes use of the data and official statistics provided and published by 
authorized sources, such as NATO or United States, and by Central European Countries individual 
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1. American Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan 
 
In this chapter, after providing the fundamental information about the ISAF mission, I will examine 
different approaches to the Afghanistan stabilization mission, from the Bush to Obama 
administrations, which are essential to understand both, the problems of stabilization mission in 
Afghanistan and the shift in the American – Central European special relationship. I will try to focus 
on four broad approaches (belief system, economic system, policy institutions, and elite decision-
making) to explain Bush’s foreign policy in general (the Bush Doctrine) and  the Bush administration’s 
approach towards Afghanistan. Finally, I will try to demonstrate the Obama administration’s 
considerable shift in focus to emphasize the Afghan stabilization mission. I will also try to explain why 
Bush’s foreign policy took its particular approach towards Afghanistan, then explain its outcomes and 
what obstacles it created for Obama’s foreign policy.  
1.1. What are the Aim and Primary Tasks of the International Security 
Assistance Force Mission. 
 
Two military operations are being carried out with the aim to stabilize the Afghan state. The first one, 
so-called Operation Enduring Freedom, began in October 2001 in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on 11 September. The American-led operation that deposed the Taliban 
regime was largely a mission with limited participation of the U.S. allies. OEF is today focused 
primarily on the Southeastern regions, along the Pakistani border, and its stabilization and 
reconstruction tasks always contained a counterinsurgency component against the Taliban and 
remnants of al-Qaeda. Despite the fact that NATO members took active part in that operation, OEF 
was not a NATO mission.18 The later NATO-lead operation, the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), was established in the aftermath of the American invasion as a parallel operation to the OEF.19 
 
                                                           
18
 John R. Hillison, New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers ? (United States: Strategic Studies 
Institute. United States Army War College, 22 April 2009), 27. 
19
Magdalena Trzpil, Afganistan jako Największe Współczesne Wyzwanie dla NATO (Warszawa: Biuro 
Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, III-2009/11), 51. 
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The ISAF mission was established in accordance with the Bonn Conference agreements of December 
2001 (more accurately UN Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413, and 1444).20 Afghan opposition 
authorities who attended the forum initiated the course of rebuilding and reconstructing their 
country by creating a new government architecture, that is to say the Afghan Transitional Authority 
(ATA). The idea of a UN-mandated international force to support a new ATA structure was 
additionally linked with the conception of constituting secure conditions in and around the Kabul 
area and help the reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. This agreement enabled the establishment 
of a three-way cooperation among the ATA, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and 
ISAF.21 
 
While ISAF was initially led by NATO nations with six-month long successive rotations (the United 
Kingdom, Turkey and Germany/Netherlands), NATO did not take a command over the ISAF mission 
until August 11, 2003. Once the Alliance assumed command, it started executing the coordination 
and planning of the Force’s tasks, including the equipping of  an army command and headquarters on 
Afghan soil. This new leadership design solved the problem of a constant search seek for new 
countries to supervise the operation and establishing of new headquarters twice a year in a complex 
environment. The advantage of a sustained NATO headquarters as well paved the way for small 
countries, not to seize leadership responsibility, but to perform greater tasks within a multinational 
headquarters.22 
 
At the beginning ISAF’s mandate was restricted only to providing security in and around Kabul. 
However, the member countries of the Alliance, primarily at the request of the Afghan authorities, 
asked permission to extend ISAF responsibilities. Once NATO became responsible for the ISAF 
mission, it began progressively expanding its role in Afghanistan.23 This was reflected on October 
2003, when the UN enlarged ISAF’s responsibilities and its newly given mandate ranged across the 
whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510).24 Thereafter, new demanding tasks were added to the 
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 Hillison, New NATO Members, 28. 
24
 It is worth to point out that majority of decisions of 1510 resolution certify arrangements approved within 
the Bonn Agreement from 2001. In: http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html 
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international forces’ responsibilities. For example ISAF became responsible for supporting the Afghan 
authorities in expanding central power throughout state, carrying out reconstruction activities, and 
helping with the process of disarming, demobilization and disbanding of local armed groups. ISAF 
was also obliged to take an active part in the creation and training of both the Afghan administrative 
structures and security forces (police and army).25 
1.1.1. Stages 
 
After NATO took command over the ISAF operation, the process of seizing comprehensive 
responsibility over the whole Afghan territory occurred in four stages. During Stage One of ISAF 
(2003-2004), international forces (predominantly French and German forces) were located in the 
northern part of the country.26 The main principle of this mission was to provide security to the 
government in the capital of Kabul. The mission was also enlarged with the expansion of Provincional 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT).27 In December 2003, the NATO Council authorized the Supreme Allied 
Commander to set in motion the expansion of ISAF mission by assuming control of the German-led 
PRT in Kunduz.28 Thereafter, on 31 December 2003, the military part of the Kunduz PRT was 
detached and placed under ISAF command as mapped below and was the first step in the 
development of the operation. Half a year later, on 28 June 2004, at the Summit meeting of the 
NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, the Alliance declared that it would form PRTs in 
Baghlan, Feyzabad, Mazar-e Sharif and Meymana, all situated in northern Afghanistan. All these civil-
military teams were established to support enlarged governance and reconstruction activities 
throughout the Afghan state. The first stage was accomplished on 1 October 2004.29  
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In turn, under UN SCR 1623, Stage Two involved Western territories, dominated by Italian and 
Spanish administrations who provided the bulk of the forces (which ended in May 2005).30 The 
evolution of this part of the mission began on 31 May 2006, while ISAF took responsibility for two 
more PRTs in the provinces of Farah and Heart, and of a logistics base in the latter.31 From September 
of that year, two extra ISAF-led PRTs on the western territories of Afghanistan (in Chaghcharan and 
Qala-e-Naw, the respective capitals of Ghor and Baghdis provinces) became operational completed 
ISAF’s expansion westward. Following this process, the command became responsible for nine PRTs 
in the northern and westerns part of Afghanistan, providing security support in 50% of the country. 
Both of these sectors were generally peaceful when NATO took over leadership there.32 In 
September 2005, NATO also deployed 2,000 additional men-at-arms to Afghanistan to assist in the 
September parliamentary and provincial elections.33 
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Thanks to relative stability in the northwestern part of the Afghanistan, both the first and second 
stages, were conducted efficiently. On 8 December 2005, after a discussion at NATO Headquarters, 
the Allied foreign ministers authorized a strategy of expanding the international forces’ role and 
appearance in Afghanistan. The first part of this strategy was to expand to the south in 2006, what 
basically meant moving into the next stage. Starting in July 31, 2006, ISAF took control over the 
southern territories of Afghanistan from American-led coalition forces, which expanded its area of 
mission to an additional six provinces (Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul) 
and its command of other PRTs – now total of 13 PRTs under ISAF control, around three-quarters of 
the country’s territory.34 However, we have to bear in mind that the realization of the third stage, 
which assumed an improvement of the security situation in the southeastern region, became several 
times postponed on the account of rebel activity. Southern Afghanistan was an area with serious 
Taliban rebel activity and therefore a crucial place of OEF operations.35 As a consequence the 
manpower of ISAF increased significantly, from about 10,000 troops to 20,000. Ultimately these 
territories were seized in August 2006 – first and foremost British, Danish, Dutch and American 
contingents represented the largest contingents of the NATO force located in the most perilous part 
of the country.36 While stage three of the ISAF mission had begun, the divergence of views among 
allies became more noticeable. NATO members mostly agreed on the operation, but they disagreed 
on the strategy how to achieve the planned goals. Many of the NATO members established national 
caveats on where and when their troops could be used. These restrictions largely restrained military 
effectiveness and generated substantial strain with the Alliance.37  
 
Finally Stage Four, which started in October 2006, implemented the final stage of NATO’s effort to 
take over responsibility for consolidation of the entire country from the US-led coalition.38 Over and 
above increasing NATO’s area of mission, the modified operational strategy also set the scene for 
increased ISAF tasks in Afghanistan, including the stationing of ISAF Operational Mentor and Liaison 
Teams (OMLT) to Afghan National Army (ANA) forces at various level of leadership.39 
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Conceiving NATO’s engagement in the Afghan stabilization mission had to be determined in the 
terms of the time length of the particular phases. From the outset, NATO planned five phases for the 
ISAF operation in Afghanistan. The first phase, described as the phase of assessment and 
preparation, was devoted to the actions conducted in Kabul and its area. The second, the expansion 
of the ISAF’s mandate over the whole Afghan territory, was finished in 2006.40 The three remaining 
phases are devoted to the stabilization, transition and redeployment processes. While since 2009 
ISAF has operated in the third phase, NATO leaders began discussing when they should enter to the 
next to last phase - the “transition” and hand over security responsibility to the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF). However, some NATO officials are concerned that entering into the 
“transition” phase could lead troop-contributing countries to enter phase five, the last 
“redeployment” phase.41 That was announced at the Lisbon NATO Summit in November 2010 – at 
which point the Alliance started entering a new phase of its mission in Afghanistan. Since 2011 NATO 
has progressively transferred the responsibility for security situation to the Afghans, aiming to 
complete this process by the end of 2014. The transition process will be “conditions-based, not 
calendar-driven and will not equate to the withdrawal of ISAF troops”. NATO also announced a long-
term partnership with Afghanistan beyond the given date of the 2014 withdrawal. It is worth 
pointing out that entering the last phase was not motivated by an objective evaluation of the security 
situation in the Afghanistan, but rather by public support in allied countries which plummeted, 
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1.2. Why Things Went Wrong in Afghanistan – American Foreign Policy 
towards Afghanistan 
 
An explanation of American policy towards Afghanistan is essential for understanding the major 
obstacles which harmed the effective conduct of the operation. The plan for international forces was 
to take responsibility over the entire nation, thereby providing conditions for Americans to shrink 
their commitment. The NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan has encountered several major 
challenges that undermine its capabilities to accomplish the operation. The mission took on a whole 
a new dimension with the Taliban resurgence in southern and eastern Afghanistan in 2006. 
Therefore, this thesis will start with an explanation of perhaps the most important ingredient of 
initial failure of the mission and later Taliban resurgence, the insufficient American involvement in 
Afghanistan after the rout of the Taliban. The U.S. mission has gradually converted to a nation-
building operation, but the initial small American force engagement led the Taliban’s hard-core 
leadership to escape into Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and created further 
problems of accomplishing the mission.43 
1.2.1. Bush Doctrine 
 
Before 9/11, only a few Americans and non-Americans had foreseen George W. Bush conducting 
such a challenging, powerfully built, pro-active and engaged American foreign policy, probably even 
Bush himself. According to Robert Singh, Bush in his presidential campaign rejected everything what 
was at the core of the Clinton administration – “humanitarian interventions, peace-keeping missions 
and ‘nation-building’ efforts abroad, favoring instead a coolly calculated appraisal of America’s vital 
national interests.”44 According to Mackubin Owens, at the beginning, Bush’s administration had not 
adopted a foreign policy approach focused on terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, the core of what became Bush Doctrine. Nor had he focused on Iraq or Afghanistan - 
although, Iraq occupied a key item of concern in terms of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. 
Relations with great powers, such as Russia and China, were the centre of activity. Everything 
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changed with the terrorist attacks and Bush abandoned “realism” and transformed his approach to a 
more revolutionary style of the foreign policy.45 
 
Soon after the terrorist attacks, George W. Bush gave a speech addressed to a joint session of 
Congress on September 20, 2001.46 The “Bush Doctrine” was for the first time enunciated and 
repeated later in Bush’s landmark speeches and public rhetoric, although it was never formally 
articulated. The essence of the doctrine was contained in George W. Bush’s Second Inaugural 
Address: ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic 
movements and institutions. In every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in 
our world.’’47 According to Owens, there are three main principles upon which the Bush Doctrine is 
based.48 First, the dismissal of “moral equivalency” in global affairs. Second, rejection of the “social 
work” theory of terrorism, which more or less means that economic determinants, such as poverty 
and hunger, are the core of the terrorism phenomenon.49 Third, the acknowledgment that in the 
world after 9/11, conventional methods to deal with the threats – deterrence, containment, and ex 
post facto responses – are incapable at times when rogue states or terrorists could possess weapons 
of mass destruction. Therefore, under the Bush Doctrine, the United States implemented the right of 
a state to undertake preventive war, an action the violates international law and norms. We have to 
bear in mind that international law recognized only the right of a country to launch a preemptive 
strike against another, and only when the probability of an attack by the latter is looming. President 
Bush argued that in the era after 9/11, in a globalized world dealing with threats like calamitous 
terrorism and state and non-state actors acquiring or possessing weapons of mass destruction, this 
differentiation was no longer valid. If a strike is threatening, it could be too late simply to preempt 
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it.50 Bush’s speeches were construed by wider audiences as heralding a fundamental break with 
America’s foreign policy past. 
 
The dominant narrative about the “Bush Doctrine” argued that the American founders based foreign 
policy on the criteria of non-intervention and isolationism.51 However, foreign policy based on the 
principle of isolationism and non-interventionism was abandoned in the XX century. Owens in his 
publication argues that earlier in its history the U.S. had responded unenthusiastically to threats to 
its own national interests.52 Accordingly, he indicates that the United States since the beginning has 
been attached to a foreign policy of “realism”, whose main principle is that the leading factor in 
international affairs is national security, which can be safeguarded simply by the competent 
application of power relevant to other international subjects. Therefore, the conventional narrative 
emphasizes that “neo-conservatives” are alarmingly moralistic and idealistic in terms of foreign 
affairs. They strongly believe that Washington has a special role in spreading democracy and the 
principles of liberty. Other characteristic features to which they are committed include the 
preservation of American hegemony, suspicion of international institutions and approval of the 
unilateral use of power authorized to secure and accelerate democracy.53  
 
Considering the Bush Doctrine as a political or grand strategic modus operandi in international 
affairs, it is a foreign policy closely tied with American liberal political traditions, whose principle is 
primacy on the basis of the intersection of hegemonic stability theory and the theory of the 
democratic peace. The essence of this “benevolent” primacy is a belief that U.S. power is good not 
only for the United States itself, but also provides benefits for rest of the world. The defense of that 
argument is that United States itself can enjoy a full security only when other countries in the world 
are also secure.54 Invoking Robert Gilpin’s words, Owens notes that hegemonic stability theory 
maintains that a “liberal world order” does not come to being in the heat of the moment, as an 
outcome of some global “invisible hand”. The existence of liberal institutions is not enough. To 
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uphold liberal world order, Washington has to be eager and able to preserve it. He strengthens his 
argumentation by citing Ethan Barnaby Kapstein’s opinion that such a system necessitates a 
“hegemonic power, a state willing and able to provide the world with collective goods of economic 
stability and international security”. In accordance with hegemonic stability theory, without U.S. 
power the world would experience a less safe and peaceful global order.55 In this way, both United 
States after the Second World War, and Great Britain before, carried out the supremacy role in global 
affairs not out of altruism, but merely it was in their national interest to take it up.  
 
Coming back to the theory of the democratic peace, it is widely assumed by liberal internationalists 
that at the core of the “democratic peace” idea is the assumption that liberal democracies do not 
fight among themselves. This theory is based on Immanuel Kant’s concept, presented in Perpetual 
Peace, that the consequence of development of constitutional republics was peace among states. 
Not only President Bush made use of that idea, but also president Clinton. The latter, in his 1994 
State of the Union address, said: ‘‘Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a 
durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each 
other.’’ What is more, in 2005, Congress legislated the Advance Democracy Act (introduced by 
Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman), which states: ‘‘Wars between or among democratic 
countries are exceedingly rare, while wars between and among nondemocratic countries are 
commonplace, with nearly 170,000,000 people having lost their lives because of the policies of 
totalitarian governments.’’56 
 
Another interesting interpretation of the Bush Doctrine, in relation to the four schools of “American” 
foreign policy thought, can be found in Singh’s publication. He claims that Charles Krauthammer in a 
similar vein identified the Bush Doctrine as “less one of neo-conservatism than ‘democratic realism’” 
- “metaphorically Jacksonianism and Wilsonianism had been melded into a new hybrid, one unafraid 
to project American power or American values – indeed, one that saw the combination as 
inextricably linked for the preservation of American security. In this regard, the traditional biases of 
foreign policy approaches were subverted. The Bush Doctrine embraced liberal idealists’ faith in 
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(American) values, agreeing that the form of domestic regimes bore directly on their foreign policies 
and that ‘democratic peace’ proponents had it right. But the Doctrine evinced a much more tepid 
faith in international law and multilateralism as promising instruments to ensure liberty’s advance in 
the new era. Wilsonian ends were thus married and hardheaded, realist means to yield idealism 
without illusions”.57 The combination emphatically confirmed that, under the Bush Doctrine, the US 
was no longer a “status quo power”.58 
 
While scholars argue over the extent of shift and the break with American foreign policy continuity, 
for Singh it is obvious that the terrorist attacks allowed for the development of policies which before 
would not have been possible at all, or at least would not have flourished in such considerable 
piecemeal and fitful fashion of previous conditions.59 Citing Inderjeet Parmar - “the new more 
aggressive foreign policy pursued by the Bush administration [was] merely made more acceptable by 
9/11, not made by 9/11 itself.” Nevertheless, as believed by Singh, the September terrorist attacks 
not only assisted the progress but forced a re-evaluation of the U.S. global role as a ‘reluctant 
sheriff’.60 Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol in 2003 described the post 9/11 “neo-conservative” 
world view. They argued that during the post-Cold War era, liberals and realists had approached the 
global order from distinct intellectual postulates but supported a shared purpose of a “minimalist 
approach to foreign policy – one because the very concept of self-interest provokes discomfort, and 
the other because it defines the national interest far too narrowly.” Instead, George W. Bush 
promoted a “distinctly American internationalism” and powerful foreign policy by excluding both 
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George H. W. Bush’s “narrow realism’ and Clinton’s “wishful liberalism”.61 However, Singh argues, 
some policies that owe their origin to 9/11 were evident long before the terrorist attacks.62 From the 
beginning of his presidency Bush’s approach called for struggle against excessively burdensome 
limitations – from international laws to allies – to pursue America’s security and to modify the global 
status quo to cope with security perils.63 Supporting this theory, according to Mackubin Owens, 
rather than “neo-conservative” innovation, Bush adopted an approach which kept to the tradition of 
American foreign policy since the Early Republic: “The Bush Doctrine represents a continuation of a 
policy that fuses American security and the ‘American Mission.’ The ‘ultimate goal of ending tyranny 
in our world’ has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy since the earliest days of the 
Republic.”64 Indeed, the U.S. national interest has more components than simple security. Thus, the 
Bush Doctrine, for Owen, is the “latest manifestation” of commercial and ideological factors that 
have had a major influence on national security concerns.65  
 
In summary, the Bush Doctrine, rather than being supported by experts, has become subjected to 
enormous criticism, both at home and in the world. According to Singh, critics of Bush Doctrine 
centered on three main problems of Bush Doctrine.66 First, even with commonsense argumentation, 
preventive war created more problems than it resolved. The Bush Doctrine undermined the 
legitimacy of American democratic efforts by adaptation of preemptive strike and a sense of 
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American power which is allowed to rely on own merits (unilateralism), as well putting an emphasis 
on bilateral agreements, instead of seeking cooperation within multilateral institutions – for 
example, bilateral agreements under the Bush presidency with Central European states, which will be 
described in subsequent chapters .67 The apprehension that some states, from Israel to China, would 
be able to legitimize their actions in similar fashion leads one to believe that international legal 
norms have been threatened - especially the unacceptability of wars not authorized by the United 
Nations Security Council. Furthermore, the ambiguities of judging and identifying possible imminent 
specific threats arose. Second, regime change raised serious questions about the limits of state 
sovereignty. Although the U.S. attack on Afghanistan raised only slight dissent at home or elsewhere, 
no broad-based or permanent international consensus had yet occurred about the circumstances 
under which a country could lose its sovereign status – whether because of domestic tyranny, 
genocide, supporting terrorism, or acquiring WMD.  
 
Moreover, what mechanism of intervention should be applied if such a thing were to be committed ? 
Third, the idea of American pre-eminence was open to doubt. Critics have focused on its 
“arrogance”, or “overstretch” and the excessive demands which could be only fulfilled by a more 
reasonable international balance of power. “For the majority of critics, however, the central flaw in 
this notion was less the basic goal than the overly narrow conception of power and the excessively 
limited range of instruments employed to achieve American goals.”68 The gap between American 
foreign policy goals and the attainable resources to achieve them, if anything, has grown larger in the 
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1.2.2.“Forgotten war” - Afghanistan Stabilization Mission as a Secondary 
Priority 
 
After almost nine years of war, the United States together with its NATO Allies have been 
unsuccessful in establishing a sustainable Afghan state. Scholars from both sides of the Atlantic argue 
that the American-led NATO alliance cannot demonstrate considerable achievements in terms of 
progress. All of the collected data since 2001 reveal that the Western coalition has failed in 
establishing conditions for security and state-building. The most noticeable failures are: “increased 
civilian and military casualties, expansion of the guerillas, unfavorable perceptions of foreign troops 
by the local population, absence of functioning national institutions, and growing destabilization of 
the Pakistani border, which threatens NATO’s logistical roads, essential for resupplying NATO 
forces.”70 Most of the experts seek the cause of these failures in the massive misjudgments of the 
Bush administration. Although, it would be unfair to put the blame only on the Bush administration, 
there are three major repeated allegations regarding the Afghan stabilization mission under Bush’s 
leadership: prioritization of Iraqi mission at the expense of Afghanistan, lack of nation-building effort, 
and disagreements in finding a common strategy with European allies for winning in Afghanistan. 
 
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, put it bluntly in late 2007 - “In Afghanistan we 
do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must”.71 Long before that President Bush had declared 
vigorously that he “listened to his generals” and provided them with everything what they needed to 
succeed. This may be true, but only in the case of Iraq. Thus the country strictly associated with the 
9/11 plot and war on terrorism became overshadowed by the war in Iraq. The reason for this was in 
part due to the initial successes against the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the loss of an ability to perceive 
real deepening challenges as the war wore on. At the time when the focal point of American foreign 
policy shifted west, toward Baghdad, a strategy for a robust reconstruction of Afghanistan melted 
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away. The war which was supposed to be an easy victory was camouflaged by the fact that the 
Taliban had never been defeated and they simply moved to the tribal areas in Pakistan.72 
 
In the spring and summer of 2006 the Taliban conducted the largest offensive since the beginning of 
the American invasion.73 In the same year 191 American and NATO soldiers died, which was a 20-
percent increase over the 2005 toll, generating – statistically – the fact that it was almost as 
dangerous to serve in Afghanistan as in Iraq.74 The National Intelligence Estimate alerted in July 2007 
that al Qaeda had reestablished “a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administrated Tribal Areas,” 
and what is more, “regenerated key elements of [their] Homeland attack capability” against 
Americans and their allies.75 In late 2007 Gen. McNeil was already aware that things had gone bad 
and that NATO was facing a risk of retreat.76 When NATO forces arrived, they opened and helped to 
run schools, but when they left their efforts were demolished by the Taliban. In 2008 it was even 
worse. Such events like bombings, coordinated and uncoordinated attacks and causalities seriously 
increased. Afghanistan was rather a country under siege than a country with successfully 
implemented conditions to become a sustainable state.77 Thus, as a result, by Spring 2008 for 
American troops it was far more dangerous to stay in the Afghanistan theater, simply because of the 
fact that their casualties exceeded those in Iraq.78 At the end of Bush’s presidency, rather than 
celebrating the triumph of democratic stability, his administration was facing the truth that 
Afghanistan was returning to the chaos that existed when he moved into the White House. The initial 
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successful phase of the war proved deceptive for Bush, who was surprised that the “good” war had 
gone so bad – mainly because the Iraqi war had absorbed most of the American resources.79 
 
“We are simply in a world of limited resources, and those resources are in Iraq”, said one senior 
American official, interviewed by Sanger his book.80 Most experts and scholars could agree that the 
greatest miscalculation of Bush’s administration was the premature statement of victory over the 
Taliban enemy.  On the eve of that declaration, that Americans moved on to Iraq, when in reality the 
Taliban had not been defeated. Experts and scholars, and probably later historians, will continue to 
argue whether a fuller commitment at the beginning would have prevented for Americans and NATO 
the problems of later years, and the establishment of a safe haven for Taliban and al Qaeda across 
the Pakistan border. But for many Americans who had gained experience on the ground in 
Afghanistan, Bush’s decision to make Iraq a “central front” in the war on terror was more than 
mistaken and his successors will be trying to solve this problem for a long time. 81    
 
According to Gen. James Jones, the complexities of the Iraq invasion were the main concern until late 
2007, to such a degree that the Afghan theatre had become a “forgotten war”. 82 Thus from the late 
2002 American efforts had shifted to the west, toward Baghdad. This started with the transfer of 
Intelligence and Special Forces to Iraq, which created a vacuum in Afghanistan that the Taliban, 
although notably weakened, could begin to fill. On the eve of Iraqi invasion the CIA launched a 
massive intelligence operation inside Iraq, in fact, twice the size of a similar effort two years before in 
Afghanistan. The most skilled counterterrorism and Middle East specialists and paramilitary 
authorities were transferred to Iraq. Thereby reduced was American influence on very important and 
powerful Afghan warlords, who refused to turn over to Kabul money (probably tens of millions 
dollars) which they had obtained as routine payments at border crossings. Experienced agents were 
replaced by younger officers who could not make the case to the tribal authorities that their long-
term interests required supporting a stronger central government in the capital city. Robert Grenier, 
the former director of the CIA’s counterintelligence center, concluded: “I think we could have done a 
lot more on the Afghan side if we had more experienced folks (…) if you don’t have those 
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relationships, your ability to influence goes down”. Moreover, not only the intelligence service lost its 
bearings, but also American Special Forces lost their center of interest on the leading target of all: al 
Qaeda Central, which found safe haven over the border in Pakistan.83 The Taliban’s resurgence 
became cut from the same cloth as al Qaeda’s resurgence and their association was a sort of two-
way street –“the Taliban provided a safe haven and a support network; al Qaeda paid them in 
training, expertise, and financing.”84 While U.S. Special Forces were engaged in Iraq, both bin Laden 
and the Taliban found the occasion that they needed to recreate small training camps and conduct 
fearless strikes into Afghanistan.85 Officially, the Bush administration denied that conditions in the 
tribal neighborhood had spun out of control. But in fact the phenomenon of insurgency appeared, 
and it become something for which global hegemon and its allies were not prepared. 86  
 
Secondly, the United States was insufficiently interested in rebuilding the country from the bottom 
up and when the war with Iraq started, they paid even less attention to this issue. It was easy to 
employ military force and invade the country, but it is much more difficult to rebuild it later, 
especially on such complicated soil.87 The essential concern of the nation-building effort in 
Afghanistan was that this country, since the beginning of statehood, had never been a nation 
according to the Western definition. Moreover, the people who inhabit this country, beginning with 
tribal leaders, had not been attracted by the vision of creating one. Afghanistan is situated among 
the world’s poorest and most underdeveloped countries, with appalling illiteracy and extremely low 
life expectancy (forty-three years). From the beginning of the invasion the United States did not have 
sufficient infrastructure for civilian reconstruction, and not until its second term in the office did the 
Bush administration attempt to build one. The help which Afghanistan had been receiving was simply 
insufficient. Robert Finn, the American ambassador to Afghanistan from 2002 to 2003, said 
“Afghanistan has been founded at lower level than any other postwar humanitarian crisis… I said 
from the get-go that we didn’t have enough money and we didn’t have enough soldiers.”88 Six years 
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later Finn was still convinced this problem had not yet been solved. Two years after the American 
invasion, international aid to Afghanistan ($57 per capita) was shockingly low in comparison not only 
to Iraq, but such countries like Bosnia ($679) and East Timor ($233) with much less strategic 
importance to the United States. The case of Iraq especially reveals how small the amount of money 
that was allocated for Afghanistan. In the early years, after the American invasion to oust Saddam 
Hussein, Iraq received about $18 billion for reconstruction over a period of several years. The aid 
which was allocated for Afghanistan in 2004 is estimated around $720 million. Having in mind that 
Iraq has a lot of oil reserves and its reconstruction is supposed to be self-financing by income from 
them, Afghanistan needed much more help than Iraq.89 
 
Thirdly, the Bush administration itself not only failed to employ the proper tactics in regard to 
Afghanistan, but also, when it decided to share responsibility with NATO allies, could not produce a 
common strategy for winning in Afghanistan. NATO members had showed up on Afghan territory 
with a different mission from that presented by the United States, the core of which was 
counterterrorism. The Americans focused on hunting down al Qaeda and the Taliban with the aim to 
eliminate them. The allies in contrast signed on as a peacekeeping force and focused on 
reconstruction.90 Simply, the NATO allies provided political cover, not covering fire. To make it more 
difficult, each NATO member operated under its own rules of combat and did not want to take risks 
and casualties. General McNeil concluded: “The problem with alliance warfare is that every country 
puts its national interest first and the alliance second. Every decision takes longer. Plans leak. It’s an 
interesting way to try to win a war”.91 
 
At the start, the Bush administration opposed NATO’s involvement in the war, but later encouraged 
the alliance to join the mission, becoming aware that it needed to share the responsibilities for the 
long campaign. Allied participation gave the mission an international patina whose purpose was to 
decrease and displace the impression of American occupation.92 In July 2006, NATO formally became 
responsible for security in southern Afghanistan and in late 2006 in the eastern part of the country. 
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At that time, it was already clear that NATO’s reconstruction plans could not succeed when the 
Taliban were retaking villages and destroying schools faster than coalition countries could build 
them. By 2008, when the Taliban counterinsurgency intensified, the division between NATO allies 
and the United States turned into a nightmare, because of their different attitudes to the mission 
goals (not only to the military dimension of the mission, but also in reference to political aspects of 
NATO’s role in Afghanistan). One former key commander of American forces, interviewed by Sanger 
pointed out: “Clearly, the Europeans do not see Afghanistan the way we do (…) They see it in terms 
of national reconstruction. We see Afghanistan as forward defense, and we are the only country 
willing to absorb significant casualties.”93 
 
During the first term of Bush’s Presidency the real lesson of the Afghan war had gradually come out: 
“While the United States wields the world’s largest hammer, not every problem is a nail.”94 In 
Kilcullen’s view the United States had been “overconfident after the fall of the Taliban”. 95 Filled with 
arrogance of military power, inadequately interested in terms of nation-building effort from the 
bottom up, and keen to believe in Pakistan President Musharraf’s promises, the Bush administration 
forgot its fundamental objective: the destruction of the Taliban and al Qaeda. The international aid 
finally flowed into Afghanistan years later, but in a country plagued by corruption this money could 
not be properly and efficiently used. By his second term Bush and the most powerful figures around 
him understood that without a good strategy for reconstruction all military gains since the beginning 
of the operation would be lost.96 At the end of his presidency - although 2008 opinion polls indicated 
that a vast majority of Afghans supported America’s presence and were opposed to the Taliban 
regime – Bush had little room for maneuver to convince Afghans there was a real substitute to life 
under the hated Taliban regime and to an economy dependent on poppies income. Thus, Afghans 
became concerned whether America had the will to make a difference.97 Before the Bush 
administration had ultimately realized that winning in Afghanistan needed a greater commitment, 
almost irreparable damage had been done when Afghanistan started to return to anarchy.98 All 
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available data from 2006/2007 shows that opium production mushroomed and that Afghanistan 
became the world’s first producer of heroin and money from the narcotics trade generated half of 
Afghanistan’s GDP. Afghanistan once again had become an narco-state. The largest part of the 
production was in the southwestern part of the country, Helmand Province, and the Taliban not by 
accident were strongest on that territory, and became financed by the drug trade. 99 The United 
States and NATO failures on the Afghanistan-Pakistani border between 2002-2008 are a clear 
example of strategic distraction.100 For some experts, the United States lost track of defeating al 
Qaeda and Taliban by not only giving prioritization to Iraq, but also by treating Afghanistan and 
Pakistan as separate problems, not a single battlefield, although Taliban and al Qaeda treated this 
cross-border territory as a single tribal land.101 
 
Gen. Douglas Lute spoke the “terrible truth” in 2007 - “The truth is that you have to think about this 
problem in thirty-year terms”. In 2008 he revised his assumption to fifty-years. 102 But no one wanted 
to face the hard reality that wining in Afghanistan could mean staying there for decades. 103 Another 
important general, Kilcullen, who helped to rewrite the Defense Department’s strategy for “long-
duration unconventional warfare”, stated that this kind of war “involves everything Americans are 
worst at”, beginning with patience. Thus, according to Sanger, “the Taliban reached an obvious 
conclusion: Their greatest weapon was not the car bomb or the roadside IED, the improvised 
explosive devices that caused devastating injuries. Instead, it was American tentativeness, an 
unwillingness by Bush or other officials to commit troops, money, and resources for the years, if not 
decades, it would take to rebuild the country.”104 
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1.2.3. Obama’s “Winning in Afghanistan” Strategy 
 
"I took office at a time when many around the world had come to view America with skepticism and 
distrust. Part of this was due to misperceptions and misinformation about my country. Part of this 
was due to opposition to specific policies, and a belief that on certain critical issues, America has 
acted unilaterally, without regard for the interests of others. And this has fed an almost reflexive anti-
Americanism, which too often has served as an excuse for collective inaction." 
- President Obama, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2009 
 
When Bush finally finished his second-term in office and handed power over to Obama, American 
society was overwhelmingly disappointed with his presidency.105 Rather than the unsuccessful 
Afghan stabilization mission, the unpopular and controversial Iraqi war was the leading reason for 
both public anger at home toward American foreign policy and the decline of America’s moral 
authority overseas.106 Using the idea of promoting democracy, Bush and his team made it 
“radioactive at home and abroad”. According to Madeline Albright, “They give democracy a bad 
name.”107 Barack Obama started his presidential campaign promising that he would seek to renew 
America’s relationship with the world. The signaled break with his predecessor’s foreign policy was 
proved during the first year of his presidency in a series of ambitious speeches about sharing global 
challenges together with other nations. If Bush generally saw things in, lets say, “conservative 
glasses” - “us versus them”, Obama started to come back to Clinton’s “liberal” perception of the 
world – “us and them”.108 Although his approach to foreign policy gave him much support, especially 
at home, the first years of his presidency show that it will be genuinely hard to fulfill his goals.109 
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Although there are important differences in Obama’s engagement strategy toward Afghanistan in 
comparison to Bush’s approach, there is also a solid succession to the 43rd administration’s policies 
and philosophies, which it tried to implement in its final two years.110 Since the decision in late 
December to strengthen American’s military commitment in Afghanistan, and to treat it together 
with Pakistan as a single battlefield area, the Obama administration’s public engagement strategy, 
according to Kristin Lord and Marc Lynch, encompassed several elements: 
 
 
• Among NATO allies, build public support for, and limit public opposition to, civil and military 
assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
•  In Afghanistan and Pakistan, counter Taliban and extremist narratives and undermine links 
between local narratives and the global al Qaeda narrative, while empowering Afghans and 
Pakistanis to counter extremist narratives. 
• Reverse the trend toward greater anti-Americanism in Pakistan, while encouraging public 
support for counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
• Fight Taliban and extremist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan in ways that minimize 
public discontent and opposition.  
• Communicate successes on the battlefield to publics, whose support will depend at least 
partially on whom is perceived to be winning, and prevent enemies from manipulating 
information and images in ways that challenge that perception. 
• Enhance the legitimacy of indigenous governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan to build the 
capacity of those local and national governments to sustain good governance and render U.S. 
and NATO support unnecessary. 
• Strengthen long-term relations between the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan on the one 
hand and Americans on the other.111 
 
The Obama administration’s principal objectives in public engagement, both in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, are dependent on the support of doubtful alliances with the governing regimes and popular 
support. In Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s view, the principle strategic communication effort tries to 
                                                           
110 Mark Lynch, Rhetoric and Reality. Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama (Washington, D.C.: Center for a 
New American Security, June 2010), 1-2. 
111
 Lord and Lynch, America’s Extended Hand, 32.  
   
 
32 
“maintain and strengthen the Afghan population’s positive perception of and support for” the central 
government in Kabul and the commitment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 
international community.112 Although the Obama administration can already show some success, for 
example in additional NATO members’ contribution to the ISAF mission in the fall of 2009 and the 
Netherlands’ renunciation of the intended withdrawal of 2000 troops from Afghanistan, by the end 
of 2010 an alarming trend could be perceived. However there is no denying that Obama’s new 
civilian strategy in Afghanistan, to gain support of the population, could have positive effects. 
Moreover, for the first time this strategy has been followed by considerable resources and effort. 
However, this strategy could succeed only when the United States and Afghan government not only 
battle corruption but also convince the Afghans of that priority. Additionally, now or never, the 
United States together with NATO have to make Afghans warm to their presence, that they are not 
occupying army, and they are capable of controling Afghan territory, protect the people, and 
ultimately bring stability. It looks as if this strategy contains much more positive elements in 
comparison to Bush’s approach, but it needs to be constantly evolving and show tangible progress. In 
the case of Pakistan, the effort at gaining public support is far from successful and a change in 
people’s attitudes is likely to be slow and long. Thus, “the role for public engagement is therefore to 
accentuate areas where this is happening, build strong relationships with opinion leaders, and 
contribute to a foundation of trust in which American actions might be interpreted less negatively 
and its intentions might be less suspect.”113 It seems that Barack Obama started effectively in moving 
away from the Bush’s strategy on “Global War on Terror”.114 But even so, the Bush administration’s 
unresolved issues in Afghanistan and Iraq and massive misjudgments about correct strategy, means 
that Afghanistan will create even greater challenges to Obama than it did to his predecessor. Obama 
probably would like to decrease American commitment in Afghanistan, but he knows that without 
American effort and leadership it will be impossible to solve the Taliban and al Qaeda problems, 
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2. Central European Countries’ Engagement in the Afghan 
Stabilization Mission. 
 
To this point this paper has focused on the general information about ISAF mission and American 
foreign policy toward Afghanistan under Bush and Obama’s administrations. Each mission has a 
landmark event or distinct factors which shape the final outcome of the operation. And as I tried to 
emphasize in the previous chapter, the most probable answer to the question why the things went 
wrong in Afghanistan can be found in the American approach to the war on terrorism - Afghanistan, 
in contrast to Iraq, was simply too low in the hierarchy of the war against terrorism. But American 
foreign policy has also another important dimension in the context of Visegrad group member 
countries. In essence, American foreign policy is applicable to the on-going worldwide policy debates, 
also in the Central European region, about where the United States can find reliable allies. 
From the beginning of the Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO had offered support to the 
stabilization mission on Afghan soil. However, The United States strategists and policy-makers were 
unwilling to place international forces and themselves under a multinational command and NATO’s 
“consensus-oriented decision-making procedures” - which ineffectiveness was strongly remembered 
from the Kosovo campaign. Even so, being aware that the only alternative could be sending larger 
numbers of their own troops with the aim to stabilize and reconstruct the Afghanistan, the United 
States had no other way than to accept European support for the operation.115 
However, the Europeans had contributed troops to the operation on the basis of a loose consensus, 
and as the consequence their reasons for doing so varied greatly. The United Kingdom, likewise 
Germany, were motivated to strengthen the transatlantic security framework, while another major 
actor, France, saw European commitment to the mission in the terms of a genuinely emerging 
European security identity. Regardless of major European countries reasons to participate in the 
mission, the real question to answer is what precisely moved Central European countries to 
participate, and how large was their contribution in comparison to older NATO members.116 Thus, my 
focus in the following chapters is on Central European countries’ participation in the ISAF mission 
with the broader international context and its outcome for American – V4 countries relations.  
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2.1. Where Have You Come From and What Do You Want ? Interests 
Analysis 
 
Joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was one of the main priorities of the Visegrad Group 
member countries’ foreign policy since the 1990s. After five years of planned participation in the 
Partnership for Peace Program, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland finally became a members of 
the Treaty in March, 1999. Unfortunately, due to unfavorable conditions, the path into NATO 
became for Slovakia much longer than the other V4 countries and took Slovakia five more years to 
become a full member.117 
The fundamental role of NATO in Central European countries’ security can be found in basic strategic 
documents which shows that in the XXI century NATO became the main pillar of V4 member 
countries’ security policies. Visegrad group member countries confirm that NATO is fundamental for 
their security situation and security and stability in the transatlantic space. Among the prerogatives 
of their foreign policy agenda, V4 countries emphasize the great importance of strengthening 
transatlantic relations.  
In accordance with the Czech Republic’s Security Strategy (adopted in 2003 and modified in 2007), 
Prague visualizes a strategic partnership between EU and NATO as “the basis of security in the Euro-
Atlantic area”.118 In the eyes of Warsaw, NATO seems to be the best guarantee of Polish sovereignty 
from any aggression.119 According to the National Security Strategy of Poland adopted in 2007, “the 
North Atlantic Alliance is for Poland the most important form of multilateral cooperation in a political 
and military dimension of security and a pillar of stability on the European continent, as well as the 
main platform of trans-Atlantic relations”. In Slovakia’s perception, NATO is “the only real security 
guarantee” and “a key strategic security forum” for peace and stability, both in Europe and the 
world. For Hungary NATO is also at the core of its security policy.120 In regard to NATO, Budapest 
believes that “more effective forms of co-operation are needed in adapting partnership co-operation, 
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giving greater consideration to the specific needs of individual countries and regions(…)” and “(…) For 
this reason, Hungary has an interest in a gradual and flexible development of the current partnership 
frameworks while keeping the transatlantic nature of the Alliance intact. In terms of developing 
partnership, Hungary offers greater attention in supporting three new PfP members from the Balkans 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro), and expects this support to yield stability and security in 
its neighbourhood. Ukraine, Russia and the European CIS countries are also of primary importance for 
Hungary” - concludes the note of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.121 
2.1.1. Security Conditions of the Central European Region in the XXI century 
 
NATO’s enlargement (and that of the EU as well), considerably changed the security environment in 
Central Europe. Central European countries  became an integral part of the “West” in political-
military terms, and in economic affiliations as well. New EU members no longer belong to a “Europe 
between” – the object of geopolitical games between West and East. On this account, permanence 
and stability of integration processes in Europe is probably the most important security condition of 
the Central European region.122 When the fundamental and common aim of CEC was to join both 
NATO and EU, they conducted a relatively joint foreign policy. A substantial shift of interest occurred 
in these countries when their goals were achieved. Thanks to EU funds, Central Europe has 
accelerated its economic development and cultural advance. Thus all CEC are in favor of maintaining 
the EU budget on sufficient levels. Unfortunately, all remaining interests often became different or 
divergent. Such circumstances heterogeneities and fragmentize the nature of links uniting them, with 
the exception of the security interests vis a vis the neighboring Russian Federation.123 The reason is 
that Central Europe – especially Central-Eastern Europe, considered as an intermare territory – is not 
uniform in terms of recognized threats. In substance the differences in this regard exist between the 
southern and northern parts of this region. For the northern part of the region, the proximity of 
Scandinavia has become a factor which positively influences internal and external stability, as does  
the proximity of Germany depending on the current status of relation between Berlin and CEC (and 
also between Berlin and Moscow).124 
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In this regard, we can observe that V4 countries geopolitical position with the accession to the EU 
took on another dimension. Poland, with its 1143-km Eastern border, now posses the longest 
continental border with the non-EU states. The border issue became a security and foreign policy 
priority for all V4 countries, except for the Czech Republic which neighbors only other EU states. 
Warsaw focuses its neighborhood policy on two Eastern European countries, Belarus and Ukraine, 
while Prague is less occupied by this issue. The core of Budapest’s policy is its southern orientation 
and the Western Balkans area. For that reason, since the EU enlargement, Poland became the 
country most involved in the Eastern dimension of the EU policy, and creates this policy agenda 
within the Eastern Partnership framework (particularly aimed on the integration process for 
Ukraine), which is considered by Russia as interference into its sphere of influence.125 
The conceptualization of security policy differs in Central European countries, and to some extent, 
represents different attitudes toward Moscow. The major and immediate threat is attributed to neo-
imperial Russian foreign policy (although Slovakia’s openness to Russia contradicts this thesis). 
Moreover, due to the historical past and geopolitical vulnerability Warsaw is very sensitive to close 
German-Russian cooperation which in Polish history has had only bad connotations for maintaining 
national sovereignty. To bring about the submission of Central and Eastern European countries, 
Moscow tries to take advantage of their energy dependence. The Kremlin has also made efforts at 
destabilizing the internal situation of Soviet successor states to prevent the consolidation of the 
status quo.126 The real existence of a threat from Russia emerged when Moscow launched a 
conventional attack on Georgia in 2008 and when the Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, publicly 
warned that he would give an order to deploy Russian missiles with nuclear warheads in the 
Kaliningrad region, if the United States implemented its missile defense plans in the Czech Republic 
and Poland. Meanwhile, Russia’s attempts aimed at keeping Europe and Washington away from its 
“near abroad” following the “colored revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine, together with plans of 
expanding economic cooperation with European states from the position of a great supplier of 
energy was considered by Poland as a Russian revisionist foreign policy.127 Thus, in these terms 
Poland has rather more similar security interests to Russia’s immediate neighbors – Estonia, Latvia, 
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Lithuania – than to other members of V4 group.128 Nevertheless, the close relationship of Russia and 
Germany in the XXI century - when Berlin as a major power in the EU and NATO became also allied 
with the V4 countries and a major advocate of Polish interests in the EU – does not represent a 
threat for conventional aggression, and by the same token a real security threat from this side for 
Poland in the XXI century.129 Therefore, many factors have played a role in the engagement of V4 into 
the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, however, it seems not to be caused by security conditions of the 
region in accordance to real threat from Russia. We have to bear in mind that Germany, Poland and 
Russia at present times are in a similar positions in many ways after the collapse of Soviet bloc. They 
found themselves in a different geopolitical situation and had to find new identities as they faced 
threats in new era. Poland, although its borders did not change, had to deal with 7 new neighbors. 
However, for hundred years Poles do not face the old question, extremely important to the country’s 
existence: “With Russia against Germany or with Germany against Russia?”. The re-evaluation of 
foreign policy agenda had significant geopolitical justification: the geographical location of Germany 
– Poland – and Russia and their future role in the new European security system. Germany paid a 
considerable price for the country’s unification and since that has had to deal with problems of both 
the East and the West. In turn, Russia has to cope with European and Asian challenges. On the other 
side is Poland, lying between these major European countries, simply a borderland which exemplifies 
both the economic border of the EU and the security border of NATO. New countries who lay 
between Russia and the V4 countries and their relations to Moscow and to the West have not been 
made clear yet.130 
From a global perspective the EU is a sub-region of the world. In other words, the security of the EU 
can not be considered apart from the nature of processes that are shaping the world and their 
associated risks. Moreover, it is also linked with other world regions with whom the EU competes or 
from where these risks come from. This is more important, given that currently we are observing 
rapid changes in the global order, which have resulted in a gradual decline of the West’s current 
position (i.e. the EU and US) in favor of East and South Asia (China and Indie). "The feature that 
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distinguishes the international security system that has persisted since 13-14 years is ambiguity, 
uncertainty and unpredictability."131 
Moreover, due to the threat of terrorism, contemporary notions of security have erased the border 
between internal and external security. All institutions – not only within particular countries, but also 
on the EU level, have to a greater or lesser extent been made responsible for security issues.132 When 
a new security situation emerged after 9/11, the proliferation of WMD and existence of rogue 
regimes became the major threats for Western security, and therefore for Central European 
countries as well.  
During the Cold War and past decades, the Alliance limited itself to concentration on defense 
preparations and necessary mobilization of armed forces aimed to deter or repel an attack from 
neighboring territories. At the turn of century NATO faced new and diverse challenges. In April 2009, 
NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit and as the result the Alliance 
policy related to “out-of-area” mission was changed.133 The present concerns of NATO members are 
still related to threats to borders security as a consequent regional disputes or attempts aimed at 
political intimidation of allied states (this matters a lot to all Visegrad group member countries). 
Warsaw and the Baltic states became known as the advocates of the orthodox group, emphasizing 
the significance and rationalization of NATO’s original idea, and its anti-Russian approach.134 
Regardless of these factors, NATO has to face threats which are more various and less foreseeable – 
acts of terrorism, proliferation of advanced military technologies (including nuclear technology), 
cyber attacks, sabotage acts against pipelines, etc. In many cases effective defense against these 
threats must begin far away from the NATO members territories. The Alliance has already reacted to 
this new reality and consequently supported the new Afghan authorities in their fight against 
extremism.135 
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The ISAF mission in Afghanistan is definitely the largest operation that NATO has ever undertaken in 
its history. Each member of the Alliance contributed to the operation, and a majority of them 
gradually increased their engagement, including the V4 member countries.136 The Afghan 
stabilization mission is a new challenge for Central European countries in the XXI century, and 
probably the most important and the most difficult mission for Central European armed forces. It is 
clear that is in the interest for Central European countries to strengthen the Alliance and participate 
in the constant validation of its political and military credibility. In addition the Afghanistan mission 
provides the opportunity to gain invaluable experience for Central European armed forces. Central 
European perceptions of the prestige and importance of the alliance implies their active participation 
in international missions conducted by NATO. Central European countries cannot claim from the 
North Atlantic Alliance costly investments or seek to deploy its bases in their territory and at the 
same time say that their armies and soldiers will remain in their barracks. Central European countries 
(especially Poland) want to be present as major actors of the stabilization mission in Afghanistan. 137 
The success of the operation will confirm the credibility and strengthen the cohesiveness of the 
Alliance. The failure of the NATO-led ISAF mission would weaken the Alliance, and de facto, one of 
the pillars of Central European security. The triumph of the Taliban could also lead to destabilization 
of a whole region, starting in neighboring Pakistan.138 Finally, CEC’s performance on Afghan soil has 
direct implications for their relations with the United States.139 
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from undertaking a decision to suppress the Solidarity movement. Moreover, the intervention costs of the 
Soviet Army in Afghanistan exceeded in total 100 mln $, what caused the Soviets to become bankrupt and as a 
consequence to the demise of whole communistic bloc. There was no telling what would happen if during the 
moment of changes in Europe on 1989, the Soviet Union would have had greater economic strength. The 
changes could have taken the Chinese way of transformation – with opening of the market, but keeping an 
undemocratic political system. In: Winid, Udział Polski w Działaniach Stabilizacyjnych, 10. 
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2.2. Central European Countries contribution to the ISAF mission and 
their primary tasks 
 
When Central European countries entered NATO, together with other members they became obliged 
to participate in foreign military operations under the Alliance flag. Once NATO had seized command 
over the ISAF operation in August 2003, it forced the member countries to give greater focus on that 
mission. Poland has been participating in the actions undertaken by the international community in 
Afghanistan since March, 2002.140 The Czech military forces have participated in NATO’s mission in 
Afghanistan since 12 March 2004.141 Since 2003, Hungary has contributed actively to the ISAF mission 
and from year to year has taken on responsibilities relative to its combat and reconstruction 
capabilities in performing stabilization tasks (but all V4 countries are recognized as a Troop 
Contributing Countries since 2003).142 The initially slight engagement of all V4 countries was criticized 
in Brussels and in Washington. Poland, the largest V4 country, was continuously under pressure to 
increase the scope of involvement in NATO operations in Afghanistan. Other members of Visegrad 
group were also criticized for lack of commitment. At the beginning of 2005, the Polish government, 
noticing that its engagement in NATO’s stabilization activities in Afghanistan was inadequate to the 
potential, capabilities and importance of Poland within the Alliance, started work to increase Polish 
participation in the mission.143  
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 Winid, Udział Polski w Działaniach Stabilizacyjnych, 8. 








The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia also wanted to take on an increased burden of activities. 
For Central European countries the ISAF mission in Afghanistan become one of the greates military 
challenges which they had to face in recent years. Certainly, the ISAF stabilization mission is carried 
out in cultural, civilization and climatic conditions which entirely diverge from European realities.144 
Central European contingents undertaking activities within the NATO framework have given support 
to legally elected Afghan authorities. The success of international forces depends not only on military 
activities, but also on a complex approach which was abandoned at the beginning phase of the 
American invasion of Afghanistan. Central European forces in Afghanistan carry out tasks related to 
counter-drug business activities, protecting borders, building roads, spreading education and in the 
meantime accommodate them to conditions of an Afghan society with society based on clans and 
tribal bonds. Therefore, an important element of ISAF mission are the rebuilding and reconstruction 
activities carried out within Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Central European forces within ISAF are 
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also responsible for training Afghan security forces, to help them further take over responsibility for 
the country’s security. ISAF forces, and Central European contingents within them, are thus 
considered more positively among Afghan society – not as occupying forces but as a guarantors of 
stability and security.145 
 
Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html (Archive Placement valid as of 16
 
August 2011) 
                                                           
145
 Winid, Udział Polski w Działaniach Stabilizacyjnych, 17. 




Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html (Archive Placement valid as of 7 June 2010) 
 
2.2.1. Czech Republic  
The Czech Republic executed its contribution to the peacekeeping mission within ISAF, FINGAL 
Operation, by deploying armed forces to Afghanistan in May, 2002. The military contingent was a 
part of 6th Field Hospital (FH), a platoon of guards and a Military Police team. In total, Prague 
deployed a 269-strong military contingent in the FINGAL operation untill January 28, 2003. Since 
February 1, 2003, 11-member Czech field surgical teams were also structured interchanging their 
duties with the German FH within ISAF until April 24, 2003.146  
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The 6th Field Hospital contingent, was relocated into the area of responsibilities in three phases. In 
the first stage, which begun on April 24, 2002, five members of a surgical company joined the 34th 
British FH in Bagram. The second phased involved a logistic support group of 35 members that was 
sent to perform its duties in Kabul. Finally, an additional 110 personnel were deployed with 
equipment to Kabul. The contingent was mainly responsible for providing health care for ISAF 
personnel and humanitarian assistance for the local people. In mid-October 2002, the 11th FH 
replaced the 6th FH, and continued to carry out the same tasks until January 28, 2003.147  
Prague, in response to the request of the Allied Command Operations – SHAPE, to expand its 
commitment, increased its contribution to ISAF mission by installing a Field Hospital, and by sending 
chemical detachment and a group of military policeman. On the basis of the Czech government’s 
decision, the development of a field medical facility started in March 2007, and is being prolonged in 
accordance with the government decisions. A Czech contingent is also deployed at the Kabul 
International Airport (KAIA).148 The 4th Contingent of Armed Forces of the Czech Republic – Field 
Hospital and Chemical Detachment was established by 104 Czech and 7 Slovak soldiers and deployed 
for less than six months. The contingent carried out the following tasks: “Providing medical service to 
ISAF personnel; Transiting patients and preservation of their conditions prior to strategic evacuation; 
Forming of mobile teams in case of mass casualties to operate as far as 10 kilometers around the 
Kabul airport; Conducting preventive medical and veterinary care within the area of responsibility; 
Cooperating in education of medical personnel of the Afghan National Army and security forces”.149 
Additionally, starting from the end of April 2007, a 35-member Czech Military Police contingent of  
Special Operations Group (SOG) served in Helmand Province (in the south of Afghanistan). The 
detachment supplemented British brigade capabilities and guarded precise individuals and objects 
and facilities of critical importance. On the strength of the Czech government decision, the SOG 
mission ended in December 2008. The Czech Special Forces in the strength of 100 men had operated 
in Kandahar province under the US Command within the Operation Enduring Freedom in the years 
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 The people of Afghanistan were able to obtain health care at the hospital in Bagram, with the help of mobile 
medical groups and a temporary dispensary and also by possible access for selected patients from remaining 
hospital facilities through a combined effort with local Kabul medical institutions.   
148 The Czech contingent contained the following military personnel: Field Hospital Personnel (81), Chemical 
Detachment Personnel (8), Operational, Monitoring and Liaison Team (8), Meteo Service Personnel (4), Air 
Traffic Personnel (2), Military Police Personnel (3). 
149
The chemical detachment member staff is predisposed to take samples for ad hoc analysis and report HQ 
hence. In: http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=12097 
   
 
45 
2004 and 2006. The last deployment of 100 Czech Special Forces troops started in November 2008 
and finished at the end of 2009.150 
The Czechs also responded to the Dutch government request to increase the number of soldiers 
securing PRTs in Uruzgan province in southern Afghanistan. The Czech Prime Minister, Mirek 
Topolanek, declared that the proposed expansion in commitment was due to “growing 
responsibilities in the region and obligations to our allies in NATO”.151 The governmental proposition 
to send additional troops to the Regional Command-South of ISAF was approved by both chambers 
of the Parliament for 2008, and for a further two months of 2009 by the Czech Government. The 
Czech Armed Forces’ 2nd contingent in the ISAF mission assumed operational tasks by January 16, 
2009. The contingent executed a protection of the perimeter of the Dutch Camp Hadrian (Forward 
Operating Base Hadrian) which is situated close to the Deh Rawod town in Uruzgan province, 
southern Afghanistan. Detached Czech forces were deployed at the base together with up to 200 
Dutch military personnel and soldiers of French Mountain Infantry (about 63 Czech soldiers – as of 
January 27,2009). The Czech contingent finished its mission in March 2009, and was replaced by 
Slovak armed forces.152 
The Czech Armed Forces Task Force in ISAF is a new organizational unit formed in 2010, whose 
commander-in-chief directly supervises Czech troops stationed at the Kabul International Airport 
(KAIA) and provides administrative control over the remaining Czech armed groups serving in 
Afghanistan within the ISAF operation. The contingent stationed in Kabul continues, after 
reorganization, the work of previous deployments. The Task Force (TF) is composed of units under 
direct command of TF commander (Command and Staff, National Support Element, Military Police, 
Chemical and Biological Protection Unit, Air Mentoring Team (AMT) Unit153, 1st Field Surgical Team154, 
Representation at Kabul and Bagram Headquarters) and units under independent command 
(Provincional Reconstruction Teams at the Shank Base in the Logar Province, Helicopter Unit at 




 Hillison, New NATO Members, 31. 
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 http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=11293  
153
 Air Mentoring Team – the main task of the unit is the training of Afghan airmen to pilot and maintain 
helicopters, both Mi-17 and Mi-24. 
154
 Its four-month mission started on February 7, 2011. Prague sent this unit to reinforce the French Military 
Hospital at the KAIA. 
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Sharana Base in the Paktika Province, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team  (OMLT)155, Training 
Team of the Czech Military Police in the Wardak Province).156 
The Czech Republic runs its own Provincial Reconstruction Team in Logar province which comprises 
military and civilian parts.157 The Czechs participated for three years within the German PRT in 
Badakshan Province and since 19 March 2008 operates its own PRT in Logar Province, south of Kabul. 
Their main area of responsibilities was connected with providing security in the region, protecting 
international units, and working together with local inhabitants in reconstruction of the country. A A 
Czech contingent was attached to the crew of about 200 serviceman of PRT and served together with 
Danish and German soldiers.158 The Czech Republic also responded to the request of its allies to 
reinforce its military presence in Afghanistan to provide support in suppressing Taliban activities and 
assist the Afghan government. The Czech government and both chambers of the Czech Parliament 
authorized Armed Forces to commence their involvement in the operation for 2008, in November 
2008 and approved its continuation in March 2009 for further deployment in 2010-2011. The newly 
appointed command of now the 7th Unit of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic to serve in 
assumed operational duties in February 19, 2011 and its soldiers carried out their duties for six 
months, until August 2011.159 
The First Czech helicopter deployment within the ISAF operation in Afghanistan was in December 
2009. The present deployment, 6th unit of the Czech Armed Forces (ACR), is in service in Paktika 
Province as Task Force HIPPO and is part of the American Helicopter Task Force (FALCON). The 6th 
ACR Unit is deployed at the US Forward Base Sharana in the Paktika Province and assumed 
operational tasks in May 2011, and served until August 2011.160 Both units, American and Czech, 
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 When the Czech unit finished a training phase that concentrated on the mentoring of Afghan “Kandak” 
personnel in Kabul, the unit was relocated to Wardak Province with a group of Afghans in December 2010 to 
carry out the tasks of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to take over in operational control of the designated 




 The Size of the 7
th
 ACR Unit serving within PRT Logar consists of 293 military personnel, and 11 civilian 
experts.  
158
 Each Czech contingent performed its duties for six months, in the city of Feyzabad which lays in 




 The size of the unit constitutes for 99 personnel (including 21 air serviceman) and its major equipment is 
considered three upgraded Mil Mi-171S helicopters. 
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carry out transportation assignments and observation duties on the side of commander of Regional 
Command East, RC-East.161 
Prague has increased its contribution to the mission by sending an Operational Mentoring and 
Liaison Team (OMLT). The new training team, 1st unit of OMLT, was deployed in September 2010. 
After a rotation, the commander of the present unit, 2nd ACR OMLT, assumed control on April 22, 
2011 from the commander of the previous unit. The headquarters of the Czech Operational 
Mentoring and Liaison  Team is in Carwile Base in the southern part of the Wardak Province. The 2nd 
OMLT of the Czech Republic Armed Forces unit consists of soldiers from seven units of the Czech 
Armed Forces, and in total currently 54 soldiers serve within the unit. The Czech OMLT comprises 
specialists (artillery and air controllers) who are able to fulfill specific tasks. The main area of 
responsibilities includes training, mentoring and helping an Afghan rifle battalion (Kandak) of the 
Afghan National Army (ANA) in the development of command and control. The aim of this particular 
training approach is to improve operational capabilities of all forces of the Kandak, which should help 
to create secure surroundings, set the conditions and protect the freedom of movement within the 
area of responsibility, and finally pave the way for further operations. Czech soldiers together with 
Afghan troops, and of course in cooperation with Americans, operate from three forward operational 
bases. Czech troops are fully equipped to be capable of independent activities within the given area. 
The 54-man unit also contains additional 15 command and staff officers.162  




Since 2003, Hungary’s contribution to ISAF mission has been continuously growing and in doing so, 
Budapest proves that is not a recipient of common security but advances it in NATO, and indirectly in 
the EU as well.163 In the early October 2006, Hungary took over control of the Baghlan PRT from the 
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Netherlands.164 The Hungarian Provincial Reconstruction Team came into existence on the strength 
of the governmental decree of June 2006, and increased the country’s involvement to a higher level 
and augmented it with development activities.165 The Hungarian PRT comprises several old, new and, 
at that time, future EU member countries who help to fulfill development plans. 
In 2007 the European Union established a police training operation (EUPOL) to which Hungary 
willingly contributed. Hungary’s Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement delegated 5 staff members 
to the EU operation and in the meantime carried out varied activities in support of the training of the 
Afghan police forces.166 
In order to supervise more efficiently PRTs, Hungary decided to set up a Government Coordination 
Committee (GCC) at the ministerial level on February 20, 2008, which improved the government co-
ordination and decision-making process. Both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of 
Defense hold co-chair positions in the newly set-up Committee.167 The GCC assembles four times per 
year in a body with delegates of all relevant ministries.168 With reference to the military aspect of the 
PRT, the GCC is not competent to amplify a military strategy or to specify military goals.169 
                                                           
164 Baghlan Province is situated on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush Mountains. The Province has around 
800,000 inhabitants which consists of a heterogeneous population of Hazaras, Pashtuns, Uzbeks and Tajiks who 
represent the largest ethnic group (over 50% of the population). Pusthuns presents approximately 20% of 
Baghlan total population; however, they make up majority in the Baghlan Jadid, Dahan-e Ghori and Burqa 
areas.  In the 1980s this territory was controlled by the Hizb-e Islami (Gulbuddin) and with the encroachment of 
the Taliban, it was taken over by them in 1997. Under Taliban authority the Baghlan Jadid city was the capital. 
165
 The preceding command was created in 2004 and on the strength of a two-year mandate conducted 




167 The GCC contains other members, including the finance minister, the head of the Office of Prime Minister, 




 According to Peter Wagner, unfortunately none of the Hungarian NGOs which are active in Afghanistan, 
have never been requested to participate in these assemblies to discuss their activities and their views about 
the efficiency of the PRT. 
169 Peter Wagner, The Background of the Hungarian Activities in Baghlan. Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs. 
Policy Brief, Feburary 15, 2010, http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/pub/displ.asp?id=NBWWAE  
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In 2008 about 210 staff including members of the Hungarian armed forces carried out a number of 
tasks in addition to military duties, including development of the living conditions of the Afghan 
people and greater effort on finishing projects whose aim was to provide a groundwork for 
infrastructural developments as part of civil-military co-operation (CIMIC). Civil development tasks 
are carried out mainly through expert ministries and non-governmental organizations and are 
channeled to Baghlan province and local population needs. Simultaneously they are connected to 
goals attached within the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The idea of development is 
to create sufficient conditions for the Afghan state’s self-sustaining economy through job creation, 
establishing a constitutional state, educational institutions and non-drug agricultural economy. This 
approach is guided by the implementation of projects involving local workers and deliveries to a large 
extent.170 
Hungary increased its troop presence in Afghanistan by 200 in 2010, which extended total number of 
personnel to 500 within the ISAF mission (it constitutes half of the total number of Hungarian 
Defense Forces (HDF) military staff in missions abroad). Additionally, besides the “traditional” 
missions on Afghan soil, Hungarian military forces shouldered new duties in the region in 2010. The 
Mi-35 Mentor Team stationed in Afghanistan for the first time was obliged to coach the attack 
helicopter pilots in the Afghan National Army Air Force (ANAAF). Moreover, a Hungarian Defense 
Forces Combat Service Support (CSS) and Engineer Mentor Team embarked on training the armed 
forces of the newAfghan National Army (ANA). The expanded area of activities and substantial 
military surge required the stationing of a National Support Element (NSE) in the area which controls 
and provides logistics infrastructure. In September 2010, HDF retook command of the Kabul 
International Airport, where eighty Hungarian soldiers hold diverse position under Brig-Gen. Nandor 
Kilian. In the region is also stationed Hungarian Special Operations Task Group (SOTG), which is 
deployed in fourth-month rotations and joins the American Special Forces in special operation tasks. 
The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) prolonged it active service in Khilagay, where 
the OMLT together with the Ohio National Guard advises and trains an ANA battalion.171 
In addition, in 2010 there occurred a change in the most developed contingent – the Hungarian 
Defense Forces Provincial Reconstruction Team (HUN PRT). The decay of security and the increased 




171 Szabo Bela, Increasing Role. Hungarian Defense, January 18, 2011, 
http://www.hungariandefence.com/cikk/23875/increasing-role 
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number of assaults on international forces resulted in the unfeasibility of the HUN PRT to fully 
execute its assistantance to reconstruction tasks, thus the Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Forces 
Command had to rethink its forthcoming engagement. Perhaps, HUN PRT will still make training and 
mentoring tasks as their focal point of commitment to the mission.172 
As of 16th August, 2011, was 433 Hungarians were serving in Afghanistan.  
2.2.3. Poland 
With the largest population of V4 countries and central role in the Iraqi mission, Poland was expected 
to provide valuable contributions within International Security Assistance Force mission in 
Afghanistan. However, at the beginning for an anti-terrorist “Enduring Freedom” operation, in total, 
Poland designated a military contingent numbering of 300 soldiers.173 At the beginning of January 
2002, the Polish Military Contingent (PKW) had reached combat readiness, and its direct involvement 
in Afghanistan occured in March 2002, when to the area of activities was redeployed a group of 87 
soldiers (sappers, logistics, commandos from Polish special forces GROM) and around 500 tons of 
military equipment. In practice in Afghanistan within “Enduring Freedom” a group of only 100 
soldiers were in continued operation (mostly company of sappers, and also logistic and security 
component), equipped with heavy equipment. They were stationed at the Bagram base below Kabul, 
where they have been stationed until now. Their main tasks include cleaning the terrain around the 
base and airport in Bagram of mines, development of fortifications and infrastructure of the base, 
and also distribution of fuels and water for coalition forces. Additionally, as was already mentioned, 
from July 2002 to September 2003, to help control traffic in the Arab Sea area, the warship “Rear 
Admiral Xawery Czernicki” was deployed. Remaining groups of soldiers in the Polish Military 
Contingent (PKW) were not counted in these activities. The time of PKW operating within anti-
terrorist operation was initially estimated  for half year. To make possible the further activity of the 
contingent, the President of Poland issued on 24 June 2002 another statement which prolonged the 
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 The Polish Military Contingent (PKW) takes part in the operation on the legal basis of the President of 
Poland’s decision from November 22, 2001, to use PKW within Coalition Forces operating in Afghanistan, the 
Tajikistan Republic, the Uzbek Republic and also on the Arab Sea and the Indian Ocean. In regard to two new 
amendments to this legal instrument, the territorial operational range of PKW was expanded initially on to the 
Kirghiz Republic area, and later to the Bahrain Emirate and Kuwait. The initial composition of the PKW included: 
Commando unit GROM ; 1. Sapper Brigade from Brzeg (a sapper platoon) ; 10. Logistic Brigade from Opole (a 
logistic platoon) ; 4. Chemical Regiment from Brodnica (an anti-chemical platoon) ; Bacteriological 
reconnaissance team (Wojskowy Instytut Higieny I Epimediologii w Puławach specialists) ; Logistical back-up 
warship sailors (“Rear admiral Xawery Czernicki”), See Winid, Udział Polski w Działaniach Stabilizacyjnych, 6 
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PKW mandate to the end of 2002, and again on 23 December 2002, until the end of 2003. The area of 
activity and size of the contingent did not change.174 
In the statement of the President of Poland from December 29, 2003 about using the Polish Military 
Contingent on Afghan soil, the numerical strength went down to 120 soldiers, and its area of 
operation was limited only to Afghanistan. This decision was related to the considerable engagement 
of Polish military forces in Iraq, where on September 2003 they took command over Multinational 
Division Centre-South, and deployed to the mission area a contingent of 2500 soldiers. De facto limits 
did not influence seriously the direct Polish commitment to the operation in Afghanistan, because 
since the beginning of participation of PKW in the Enduring Freedom Operation, the numerical 
strength of the Polish contingent in the area of activities did not exceed the number of 100 soldiers. 
Particularly important from the statement for 2003 was, after all, the extent of PKW involvment. It 
had ceased to be solely devoted to Enduring Freedom, because now part of it was also to be 
deployed to undertake actions with the ISAF operation. Poland joined ISAF in a symbolic way by 
sending in February 2004 two officers (Kabul airport service).175 
 
The Polish Military Contingent, in principle, limited its activities to the field of engineering until the 
beginning of 2007.176 Plans of Polish engagement in Afghanistan were formulated anew as a result of 
NATO’s decision about a change in the command operation system. On 6 April 2006 the NATO 
Military Committee decided to resign from a command based on the current corps’ model and 
approved a memorandum on the transformation of ISAF command in accordance with composite 
model (constant structure of NATO command, filled by member countries in connection with their 
commitment to the mission – how many people are involved).177 
Polish engagement in the mission has increased starting in September 2006. On 23 May of that year 
The Council of Ministries agreed to the enlargement of the Polish Military Contingent’s numerical 
strength in Afghanistan beginning 1 September 2006, from 120 to 190 soldiers and military staff by 
allotting extra personnel to ISAF forces – the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e-Sharif and to 
the Regional ISAF command. On 30 August 2006 the President of Poland signed an appropriate 
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resolution from the Council of Ministries in this regard. Next, on 22 November of that year, the 
President of Poland announced another resolution which increased PKW personnel to 1200 
soldiers.178 
 
On February 3, 2005 in Szczecin, during the meeting of defense department chiefs of Poland, 
Denmark and Germany – countries contributing to the command of Multinational North-East Corp – 
declared their readiness to take command over the XI shift of operation ISAF (from August 2007 to 
February 2008). In accordance to NATO’s decision of 9 February 2005, the corps’ command was 
attached to the rotation plan of ISAF command. At that time they assumed that taking command 
over ISAF by the Szczecin group would increase number of PKW troops in Afghanistan from August 
2007 to February 2008, by no more than 1000 soldiers.179 
This issue was discussed during the session of the Council of Ministers. It authorized on 23 August 
2005 the Minister of National Defense to undertake with Ministry of Foreign Affairs preparatory 
work in anticipation of the further commitment of Poland army in operation ISAF in Afghanistan, in 
fulfilling to Poland’s obligation towards NATO. 180  
 
The Polish presence in Afghanistan was strengthened by deploying to the region a maneuver 
battalion. The organizational scheme of Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan has changed since 
November, 2008. The newly established Polish Task Force White Eagle, which was one of the Brigade 
Battle Groups in Regional Command-East, took over responsibility for security and training of the 
Afghan security forces in the Ghazni Province. The Polish contingent is deployed in five major bases 
in the province: Ghazni, Warrior, Giro, Vulcan, Qarabagh and also in the coalition forces base in 
Bagram. Since 2010, Polish Task Force White Eagle was supported by American infantry battalion, 
what allowed it to conduct operations more efficiently in Ghazni province. American Battalion 
Combat Groups is the third subdivision, next to combat groups Alfa and Bravo, reporting directly to 
the commander of the Polish Task Force.181 In 2008 an American-Polish PRT was also established in 
the Ghazni province.182 
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Starting from 1 April, 2009, more than 70 Polish soldiers carried out responsibilities at Kabul 
Afghanistan International Airport (KAIA). KAIA group ended its mission on 1 October, 2009. During 
that time Polish soldiers protected in total 56 288 air operations. Polish personnel filled a majority of 
the key posts in KAIA, as a commanding post, the chief of staff I and the chief of logistics in KAIA, 
which had important significance for governance and efficient functioning of the airport. Poles took 
responsibility over civilian and military air operations in the air and on the airfield, coordination of air 
traffic, as well as key staff structures and elements of back-up and security. The Polish sapper group 
was responsible for detecting and disarming unexploded bombs and other hazardous materials 
threatening the security of air operations and the safety of KAIA personnel.183 
 
The above information demonstrates that Polish engagement until 2007 in Afghanistan was rather 
minimal. Enlargements of PKW since 2007 gradually strengthened the position of Poland in the 
Alliance, and the present deployment of Polish forces in the ISAF mission is 2579 soldiers and ranks 
as the fifth largest.184 
 
2.2.4. Slovakia 
In comparison to all remaining V4 countries, Slovakia has provided the leastt support to Operation 
Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. However, this 
small Central European nation has still contributed a helpful level of forces for the ISAF operation, in 
spite of governmental change (socialists critical of Slovakia’s participation came to power) and later 
the global financial crisis. During Operation Enduring Freedom, in 2002, Slovakia deployed Air 
Engineer Company (AEC - 40 soldiers) at Baghram to carry out the rebuilding of the airfield in this 
province.185 Initially, in 2005, Slovak government had decided to deploy troops to be part of the ISAF 
operation to engage in the provision of airport security. Air Engineer Company was relocated in 2005 
from Baghram to Kabul to operate under NATO’s ISAF mission. Another Engineer Company (17 
troops) which operated under ISAF was stationed in June 2004 as part of a de-mining unit at the 
international airport in Kabul (KAIA). In December 2006, Engineer Company and Air Engineer 
Company were transferred into a Multi-Purpose Engineering Unit – SLOVCON (57 soldiers) to help 
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fulfill ISAF tasks within the NATO mission. As determined by NATO headquarters, SLOVCON was 
relocated in May 2007 from KAIA to KANDAHAR AIRFIELD (KAF). The main tasks of SLOVCON include 
the rebuilding of facilities of KAF and the demining and maintaince of areas and roads in the area of 
the internal perimeter of base.186 The implementation of demining operations is a key part of the 
constant expansion and reconstruction of base facilities.187  
With respect to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the Slovak government in October 2007, and the 
Parliament in December 2008 decided to prolong the missions of the engineering contingent of 
Slovak Armed Forces at Kandahar Airfield and to deploy 5 servicemen to Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams, 5 serviceman to Operational Mentor and Liaison Team, 8 serviceman to the Field Hospital at 
Kabul Airport (April-October 2008), 5 serviceman to the ISAF’s command posts and deployment of a 
guard unit of 35 troops. Thus in 2009 the total number of Slovak military staff performing duties 
within the ISAF mission reached a number of 155 personnel.188 The new reinforcements operated 
closely with contingents from the Netherlands and the neighboring Czech Republic. Slovak forces 
within the PRT in Tarin Kowt are involved in the construction and development of Uruzgan province 
through the development of local infrastructure and implementation of various projects. The 
Provincial Reconstruction Team is generally a significant part in developing a secure and stable 
environment in Afghanistan.189 
Officers from the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team in Tarin Kowt, Uruzgan province, conduct 
ongoing training for units of the Afghan National Army (ANA), and monitor and supervise the 
implementation of daily activities. Members of the Armed Forces operate in the Dutch OMLT as 
instructors in planning and operations management, logistics, personnel and health care. They 
interact directly with the ANA units to assist in carrying out their operations, including deployment in 
the field.190 




 Slovak soldiers carry out tasks on sections of the former Russian air base terrain. Among other tasks, the 
company meets the requirements of Engineer-airport and construction work. It is mainly the repair of unpaved 
roads, construction of minor road construction, reconstruction, repair of airfields, tasks associated with the 
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Guard units on bases in Kandahar and Tarin Kowt patrol assigned sections of the internal perimeter 
bases, protect and defend the assigned objects, and carry out physical checks on persons and 
vehicles within essential I / O points. Slovak patrol units are an important part of the basic forces of 
NATO. Officers patrolling units operate in extreme climatic conditions, and face the constant threat 
of indirect (rocket and mortar attacks) and suicide attacks. They are in constant close contact with 
local populations in different environments and hygiene practices, which enhance the spread of 
contagious diseases (especially malaria, hepatitis and tuberculosis). An important task of patrolling 
units is its approach to local communities to shape a favorable public opinion in relation to the ISAF 
mission and thus contribute to the achievement of the entire mission.191  
EOD team tasks include detection, identification, evaluation of the situation and possible threats, and 
to neutralize and ensure deliverance and final disposal of unexploded explosive devices. Up to 6 
members of the Armed Forces are working in a variety of desk positions within the ISAF headquarters 
and the Regional Command South - RC (S). The National Support Element (NSE) coordinates national 
security and logistical support units, individuals, and members of the Armed Forces deployed in ISAF. 
NSE provides, among other things, evaluation of the performance of personnel activities, 
administrative support and funding for the Armed Forces contribution to ISAF. Slovak Republic as a 
NATO member state accedes to the ISAF operation with appropriate responsibilities. Its aim is to 
achieve the objectives declared at the NATO summit in Bucharest to increase the representation of 
its Armed Forces of the operation and promote a comprehensive approach by the international 
community to Afghanistan. 
Bratislava has decided to contribute to the international effort and increase the Slovak presence in 
Afghanistan, being aware that ISAF’s mission is crucial for NATO. The decision of additional 
commitment demonstrated that Slovakia as a reliable and responsible NATO member. The Slovak 
Government at that time intended to intensify its commitment with greater manpower in the next 
year, and planned to deploy in 2009-2010 new forces to reach a total number of troops of around 
250-280 soldiers.192 The resolution of the National Council of 3 February 2010 approved an increase 
in the mandate of ISAF to 319 members of the Armed Forces of National Council and a resolution of 7 
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December 2010 to 348 members of the Armed Forces. As of 16 August, 2011, under the ISAF mission 























                                                           
193 12 members serving in the ISAF headquarters (HQ ISAF IJC, RC-S, KAF and PALADIN) ; 16 members of the 
Slovak contingent headquarters and the national support element in the area of Kandahar air base ; 57 man in 
multifunctional engineer company ; 2 members of the PRT in Tarin Kowt (Uruzgan province) ; 15 members of 
OMLT ; 53 members of the unit guarding the forward operating base in Tarin Kowt ; 164 members of the guard 
unit at an air base in Kandahar ; 4 members of the pyrotechnic team (EOD TF PALADIN-S) 
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3. Experiences from the Afghan Mission – How CEC are 
Perceived by NATO and the USA and What Have They Gained 
from the Mission? 
 
In his publication, “New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers?”,  Joel R. Hillison 
analyzes new NATO member countries engagement in the context of burden-sharing within the 
Alliance. The “burden-sharing responsibility” in his monograph is defined as “the distribution of costs 
and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal” and its 
complexity is examined from a collective action perspective. Countries which do not contribute to 
the realization of the collective goal were simply described as a free riders.194 
Hillison emphasizes that in the ISAF mission (and especially in the case of Poland in the U.S.-led 
operation Iraqi Freedom) the new member contribution from the V4 group equaled or even 
exceeded those of similarly sized older Alliance members. In addition, V4 countries’ contributions 
were qualitatively distinct from particular older members in that the Central European armed forces 
had few, if any, national caveats. The increased contribution to NATO’s missions by V4 countries over 
time indicates that earlier deficits caused rather by a shortage of capability than a calculated free-
riding attitude. As Visegrad group member combat capabilities and levels of interoperability 
developed, Central European nations become more willing and competent to take on additional 
tasks.195 
Hillison’s approach in the examination of new NATO members as security consumers or producers 
encouraged me to undertake a similar study of particular V4 countries’ contribution to the ISAF 
mission by comparing them to all remaining NATO members. The analysis undertaken in this chapter 
proves that the contributions of NATO members to the ISAF mission varies considerably from country 
to country, and in the case of V4 member countries, the same features are visible. In this regard, the 
real aim of this examination will be also to answer whether the V4 countries’ commitment to the 
ISAF mission has been acknowledged by NATO and the USA as a adequate to their military and 
economy potential or instead estimated as free-riding behavior. Finally, the last part of this chapter 
will be devoted to the examination of the American – Central European relationship in the context of 
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the NATO mission in Afghanistan and the changes in American and Central European countries’ 
foreign policy agendas.  
3.1. The Evaluation of the CEC commitment by NATO and USA. 
 
For V4 countries 2011 marked the eighth year of their deployment in Afghanistan. Central European 
countries also participated in other operations during the same period (for example, active Polish 
participation in Iraqi mission). Due these “over-stretched” activities and the resulting costs in blood 
and higher expenditures, the political elite and public opinion in member countries became war 
weary.   
NATO’s ISAF operation in Afghanistan is the first “out-of-area” mission when the alliance members’ 
forces were deployed beyond Europe. NATO, although it had already led stabilization and 
reconstruction missions, the area of assigned responsibilities in Afghanistan is substantially more 
difficult. There are several factors making this mission more fragile, than for example, the 
stabilization mission in Kosovo: the stiff resistance of Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents, Afghanistan’s 
terrain, the distance from Europe, and the fact that Afghanistan has never been a state in a western 
sense with a well-functioning central government. Furthermore, the ISAF stabilization mission and 
reconstruction of the country are being attempted while combat operations proceed. And last but 
not least, even though NATO members have agreed upon the general goals of the operation, there 
are still differences of how to accomplish them.196 
 
The burden-sharing debates have been a constant feature in the agenda of NATO, but recently they 
have become more tempestuous as the United States found itself over-stretched in both, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and faced budgetary problems due to the global economic crisis.197 NATO’s 
ISAF stabilization mission in Afghanistan embodies perfect conditions for free-riding behavior to be 
present. For NATO it is the first peacekeeping mission outside of Europe. Within this mission, 
Washington and London’s priority was not to get drawn into stabilitization and reconstruction 
efforts, which in turn was regarded with skepticism by continental allies, who instead demanded 
accentuation of stabilization and reconstruction tasks for international forces. The Bonn Agreement 
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was a solution which envisaged a mix of both approaches.198 The core of the ISAF mission involves 
stability and reconstructions tasks, but NATO forces are to a greater or lesser extent preoccupied in 
combat operations which depend upon the location of the contingents and national caveats 
established by particular governments.199 In this regard the evaluation of the CEC commitment by the 
USA and NATO should be examined from two perspectives – by assesing the effectiveness of 
engagement in stabilization and reconstruction tasks, and also in combat operations. 
3.1.1. V4 Countries Troop Contributions 
 
Politically, the conduct of the ISAF mission become a leading factor which could influence NATO’s 
future. Major Alliance countries view the mission as a test case for the member countries’ 
capabilities and will to oppose existing threats to their security. However, from year to year 
opposition to the NATO mission in Afghanistan grew among the public in Europe. According to many 
experts’ declarations, considerable improvement in stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan had to 
completed in 2010, otherwise NATO’s internal solidarity in support of NATO mission could be 
substantially and harmfully undermined.200 One of the factors in examining the political will of V4 
countries is their troop contributions to the ISAF mission, which also expresses allied solidarity of 
burden-sharing responsibility. Furthermore, some NATO members claim also that the military 
commitment is paramount for security improvement and efficient reconstruction of Afghanistan.201 
 
Since the beginning of the ISAF mission, NATO leaders have experienced an inadequate number of 
allied troops in Afghanistan. At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, key members of NATO 
with combat contingents tried to persuade other allies to send more troops for the ISAF mission. 
While NATO members stated their “strategic vision” for Afghanistan and agreed to a shared long-
term engagement, they did not guaranteed their willingness to contribute a proportionate share of 
combat troops. This can be attributed to NATO’s own budget rules – when an allied country agrees to 
deploy forces to a operation, that nation is responsible for the costs related to that deployment. 
Therefore, this incentive factor limits allies willingness to commit any contingents to a operation or 
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to an additional deployment of troops. This problem becomes even more complicated in countries 
with fragile governments or coalition governments, when political leaders have to convince their 
legislatures and opinion polls to support deployment of national troops abroad. While the security 
situation has been continuously deteriorating, NATO and the United States’ military leaders were 
conducting a number of various strategy reviews. One of the identified solutions to counter the 
deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan was to send additional troops to that country. 
The outgoing American President, George W. Bush, in 2008 undertook the first steps to increase 
additional U.S. forces in Afghanistan. However, the American effort to increase considerably its 
forces was not considered substantial until the incoming Obama administration committed 
additional troops in large numbers. Shortly after Obama assumed his presidency, he made an effort 
to encourage American allies to contribute additional forces and equipment to the ISAF mission. 
Initial reactions in European countries were not promising; nevertheless their contributions have 
gradually increased.202  
 
The reluctance of the NATO members to deploy troops on Afghan soil has been driven partly by the 
opposition of Europeans who after many years have not seen significant progress of the ISAF 
operation, and partly by budget realities during a hard time of global economic crisis which has 
impacted the budgets of many nations.203 
3.1.1.1. In Comparison to Older NATO Members 
 
By 16 August 2011, ISAF had an estimated 130,697 troops from 48 troop contributing nations, with 
the 28 NATO members providing the core of the forces (126,230). The largest troop deployments in 
Afghanistan were from the United States which had about 90,000 troops, the United Kingdom 9,500, 
Germany 5,000, Italy 3,974, France 3,939, Poland 2,579, Romania 1,949, Turkey 1,840, Spain 1,523 
and Australia 1,550.204 
For the purposes of this study, I will focus on the V4 contribution to the mission after ISAF had 
expanded to the east and NATO took responsibility for the entire country. Thus, the comparison will 
comprise particularly the years from 2007 to 2011. To be able to judge the relative contribution of V4 
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countries to the NATO ISAF mission it is necessary to compare the national contributions as a 
percentage of NATO force versus a particular nation’s population as a percentage of NATO’s total 
population. Therefore I will use this approach to evaluate V4 countries’ contribution.205 To begin 
with, it is necessary to provide basic information on the V4 countries’ population and their 
percentage of the NATO population.  
 
Table 1: Visegrad Group Member Countries’ Population as a Percentage of NATO and European 
NATO Members’ Population 
Country / 
Organisation 
Population Percentage of NATO 
population 
Percentage of European 
NATO members' 
population 
Czech Republic     10 190 213     1.12% 1.80% 
Hungary       9 976 062     1.09% 1.76% 
Poland     38 441 588     4.21% 6.80% 
Slovakia       5 477 038     0.60% 0.97% 
V4     64 084 901     7.02% 11.33% 
NATO population 912 722 104 
Europe NATO 
population 
565 459 471 
Europe ISAF 
population 
668 757 893 





As we can see in the Table 1, the Czech Republic comprises 1.12%, Hungary 1.09%, Poland 4.21% and 
Slovakia 0.60% of the NATO total population (all V4 countries together comprise 7.02% of NATO’s 
population). In the first year after NATO seized a responsibility over the whole Afghan territory (data 
from 2007), the V4 troop contributions comprised approximately 1.45% of the total NATO force in 
Afghanistan and 2.99%o of the total NATO’s European members contribution (accordingly 3.12% and 
10.42% in 2011) – see Tables 2 and 4.206  
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Table 2: Visegrad Group Member Countries contribution to the ISAF Mission as a Percentage of 
NATO’s Total Troops within the ISAF Mission in Afghanistan. 





As shown above we can notice that the contributions of the V4 countries were constantly below their 
proportion of the total NATO population before and after NATO took responsibility over the whole of 
Afghanistan. On the other hand, if we compare V4 countries’ contribution to the European members’ 
of this organization, the figures become more respectable, almost meeting the demanded level of 
contribution (the lack of contribution in the years before 2007 was due to the fact some of the V4 
countries were constrained by their participation in the Operation Iraqi Freedom, OIF).207  
 
Yet to understand why individual V4 countries’ troop contributions to the ISAF mission did not reach 
a level similar to their percentage of NATO population (although they have substantially increased 
their level of contribution since 2007), it is necessary to look at the United States’ considerable 
growth of troops in Afghanistan. The United States’ troop level had grown significantly over time, but 
it was not until 2009 that with the change of administration it began to grow even more substantially 
and rapidly. The combination of low international troops’ contribution and imposed national caveats 
                                                           
207 The Czech Republic deployed 300 troops to OIF in 2003, while Belgium comparable in size, did not send any 
troops. Hungary deployed 500 troops to OIF in 2003 and nearly 290 in 2004 and 2005, before they finally 
withdrew its contingent. Poland’s participation in ISAF was also constrained by engagement to OIF. Poland had 
committed one of the largest contingents to the Iraqi mission, deploying at it start over 2000 troops and ending 
the mission under the Multinational Forces  with about 900 soldiers in 2008. Furthermore, Warsaw also played 
a leading role in the multinational sector in Iraq. At America’s request, the Polish government twice delayed its 
contingent’s withdrawal from Iraq. They finally withdraw troops in 2008, after the parliamentary elections were 
















troops in 2011 
Czech 
Republic 
1.12% 150 0.43% 620 0.49% 
Hungary 1.09% 180 0,52% 433 0.34% 
Poland 4.21% 160 0.46% 2579 2.04% 
Slovakia 0.60% 60 0.17% 309 0.24% 
V4 7.02% 550 1.45% 3941 3.12% 
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enabled Afghan insurgents to reemerge and forced Americans to nearly double their troops’ 
presence in 2009 and to reach the level of a 90,000 men strong deployment in 2011 (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: The Growth of American Military Troop Contribution since 2007 Within the ISAF Mission 





Therefore we can observe that the small increase in the percentage of the total NATO force 
contributed by the V4 countries can be  attributed simply to the striking increase in American 
contributions, which in fact grew by over 643% from 2007 to 2011(from 14,000 to 90,000 troops).  
 
Undoubtedly, Europe will be always overshadowed by Americans in Afghanistan and South Asia, 
without any need for elaboration because of the enormous differences in military potential. For that 
reason a more accurate analysis should correspond with the comparison of V4 nations’ percentage of  
the European NATO population to the percentage of their troops contribution as a percentage of  the 
European allies’ troops in Afghanistan. 
As of August 2011, the entire NATO’s European members’ contribution to the mission constituted 
less than a third (about 28%) of the total number of combat troops in Afghanistan and their civilian 
presence is still minimal in comparison to Washington’s presence with thousands of experts and 
troops deployed there. Nevertheless, the majority of the European states have engaged more armed 
forces in Afghanistan than in any modern area of conflict since the initiation of the European security 
and defense policy in 1999 (in total in 2011, 37,816 troops served from  the participating European 
countries).208 For example, Germany, had deployed the largest number of its troops abroad since the 
Second World War. 
 
 
                                                           
208 Fabrice Pothier, Europe: Loosing and at a Loss ? Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
November 9, 2009; http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=24115. 
Country 2007 2011 % growth 
The United States 14000 90000 643% 
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Table 4: Visegrad Group Member Countries’ Troop Contributions as a Percentage of NATO’s 
European Members Troop Contributions to the ISAF mission 





Given the figures from the examined data, although V4 countries’ contribution in 2007 was 
considerably under the demanded level in comparison with their population’s strength to the total 
European NATO members’ population, by 2011 it had become almost equal. However, after 
examining individually V4 countries, only Poland meets the standard as a percentage of its 
population compared to the NATO’s European population. The Czech Republic and Slovakia’s troops’ 
contribution nearly meets that standard, but Hungary’s is still noticeably below expectations. 
 
Hence another interesting, and to greater extent evaluative dimension to these calculations is a 
comparison of individual V4 states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) to the older 
NATO states of comparable population size (accordingly Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Denmark). 
When the examination of V4 countries’ troop contribution is done from that perspective, troop 
contributions by the new members of NATO were consistently at or above the level of troops 































Hungary 1.76% 180 0.98% 433 1.14% 
Poland 6.80% 160 0.87% 2579 6.82% 
Slovakia 0.97% 60 0.33% 309 0.82% 
V4 11.33% 550 2.99% 3941 10.42% 
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Table 5: Comparison of Visegrad Group Members Countries’ Troop Contributions to the ISAF 
Mission with Older NATO European States of Comparable Population Size 





The Czech Republic, which comprises about 1.12 percent of NATO’s population, had contributed 150 
soldiers to Afghan stabilization mission in 2007.209 Four years later the Czech contribution grew about 
413% from the initial level, which resulted in 620 Czech troops deployed to Afghanistan. Belgium 
whose population is almost the same as the Czech, at the same time increased its detachment from 
300 troops to 521 troops.210 In comparison to the Czech Republic, Hungary had deployed forces to a 
lesser extent (433 Hungarian troops), although its contribution still went beyond and became three 
times greater than that of Portugal in 2011.211 The conclusions from the examined data might differ 
                                                           
209 At the present time the Czech Republic’s armed forces include 24,000 troops serving in line units, 3,000 
troops in the service of auxiliary units, and 11,500 strong in men civilian personnel. In: Górka-Winter and 
Madej, NATO Member States, 28. 
210
 Belgium has 39,000 strong professional armed forces capable of participating in expeditionary operations 
(about 60% of the total); Górka-Winter and Madej, NATO Member States, 12.  
211 Today Hungary has about 30,000 soldiers (in 1989 they had more than three times larger armed forces). 
Portugal, like Slovakia, is considered a small NATO country with modest-size professional armed forces (42,700) 





















24 July 2003 150 620 413% 
Belgium 10,431,477 
39,000 
24 July 2003 300 521 174% 
Hungary 9,976,062 
30,000 
24 July 2003 180 433 240% 
Portugal 10,760,305 
42,700 
24 July 2003 150 0 93% 
Poland 38,441,588 
95,000 
24 July 2003 160 2579 1612% 
Spain 46,754,784 
126,000 
24 July 2003 550 1523 277% 
Slovakia 5,477,038 
17,000 
24 July 2003 60 309 515% 
Denmark 5,529,888 
29,950 
24 July 2003 400 750 187% 
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in the juxtaposition of the Slovak troop contribution with the Danish.212 While the Slovak contribution 
also underwent a significant increase of troop deployment (about 515% percent in comparison to 
2007), it is still more less than half that of the Danish contribution. 
 
However, what is most noteworthy is the Polish contribution to the mission in comparison to that of 
Spain.213 On average, Warsaw engaged less than 1 percent to NATO armed forces in years 2003-2006. 
The lack of engagement was mainly attributed to the commitment in Iraq, but Poland has gradually 
shifted its focus on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In September 2006, Poland at the request of the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SAUCER) met increased ISAF requirements. Warsaw, like all of 
the other V4 countries, again responded to the request from NATO and significantly increased of its 
contributions to ISAF in forthcoming years, starting from 2007. Soon after the changes at the 
ministerial levels in Poland, the newly appointed Minister of Defence, Bogdan Klich, confirmed that 
Warsaw would remain engaged to the ISAF mission “with the view to Poland’s credibility in NATO”214 
Today, Poland deployes on Afghan ground about 2,579 troops, which means a 1612% growth in 
comparison to 2007. At the same time Spain noticed 277% growth in comparison to 2007, even 
though on Afghan soil there are approximately 1000 fewer Spanish soldiers in comparison to the 
Polish deployment.215 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
- although, their armed forces are not considered to be very modern in accordance to NATO standards; Górka-
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To sum up, by looking at the troop contributions in Afghanistan, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia have done quite well. When troop contribution lagged during the early phase of the 
ISAF mission, many scholars largely attributed it to the lack of capability versus the lack of willingness 
from particular countries to contribute to the mission.216 However, some of the critics pointed to the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, which had quite large armies, and emphasized that they contributed 
less than 500 troops each to ISAF mission purposes. Analyzing the above-mentioned data of total 
troops serving in the national armed forces of “new” and “old” NATO members of comparable size, 
we can see that although V4 countries have smaller armies they have deployed larger contingents to 
serve with ISAF mission (even as Turkey deploys about 30,000 troops in northern Cyprus and at the 
same time is contributing only 1,840 soldiers, to the most crucial NATO mission in its history).217 
 
3.1.2. Defense Expenditures 
 
Military expenditures are also linked by NATO and its members to estimate allied contributions to 
the Alliance. Therefore, another interesting dimension to calculation is a comparison of individual V4 
states according to their defense budgets (in the academic literature on NATO the burden-sharing 




Active participation in NATO missions like ISAF in Afghanistan also have demanded additional 
budgetary involvement from the V4 countries. This was particularly difficult for post-communist 
states during the transformation period of the 1990s. When V4 countries joined NATO they focused 
on the admission process to the EU, what they finally achieved in 2004. Thus, increased military 
expenditures had not been prioritized by the governments of Central European countries. 
Additionally, many of European leaders had been encouraging the V4 countries to attach importance 
to their policy of contributing to an European Union force rather than to the Alliance.
 219
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Nevertheless, once V4 member countries joined NATO and became obliged to participate in the 
peacekeeping mission within the Alliance, new budgetary demands came to light. The strategic 
concept adopted at the Prague Summit in 2002 confirmed a new criterion for NATO member states 
military spending as 2 percent of GDP, and required new members to meet this standard.
220
 Today, 
few NATO countries are meeting the alliance standard of military expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP. Data from 2009 revealed that only 4 of 29 NATO member countries (France, Greece, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) meets the standard of “2%”. Further, only about a dozen meet 
another adopted standard of 50% of their troops deployable and 10% sustainable. In this regard, the 
NATO benchmark of 20% of military spending dedicated for investment goals also has been executed 
by less than half of Alliance members. The military expenditure gap is remarkably visible in a 
comparison of European countries to the United States. American expenditures comprised 75% of 
total NATO spending in 2009.221 
In a May 2008 Strategic Studies Institute Op-Ed, the lack of European determination to fulfill its 
pledges to NATO to a great extent referred to two aspects: “high European levels of social welfare 
and the pandering nature of their political systems”.
222
 The demand for military expenditures is 
much more complex than it might look. Social welfare expenditures rival all remaining government 
spending, for example, defense on both sides of the Atlantic. However, Joel Hillison emphasize that it 
does not correspond to a deterministic interdependence between both social welfare and defense 
spending. By way of illustration, France, although has spends on public social welfare more than any 
other NATO member (28.7 % of GDP), it also spent about 2.4 percent of its GDP on military 
expenditures in 2007. On the other side of the coin is Canada, whose level of public social spending is 
approximately 17.3 percent and military expenditures estimated at only 1.3 percent of GDP – in 
comparison the U.S. spends 16.2% on social welfare while on military expenditures 4 percent of its 
GDP. All these data might emphasize that there is something else than competing social expenditures 
in the equation.223 By the same token, according to Hillison, criticizing the lack of military 
expenditures on the parliamentary systems of the continent is hardly helpful or convincing. Bulgaria, 
Greece and Turkey – three European countries among six NATO members whose military spending 
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exceeds 2 percent of GDP – have parliamentary systems. What is evident is that military 
expenditures in Europe have been in regular decline since the end of the bipolar system.224 The data 
provided in 2010 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies also proves that total defense 
spending in Europe was in decline in the first decade of the XXI century (see below).  
 
Total European Defense Spending and Defense Spending Per Soldier (2001-2008) 
 
Source: Hofbauer, Joachim and Roy Levy, Gregory Sanders, Matthew Zlatnik. European Defense Trends. 
Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base (Washington: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, May 2010), 3. 
 
Moreover, the recent economic crisis strained V4 countries (except Poland which did not experience 
negative growth of economy, the only one to do so in Europe), and placed additional pressure on 
their defense budgets.225 In the case of V4 countries, military expenditures were also influenced by 
several other factors. To emphasize once again, for all of them it was simply unreachable or 
impractical to meet the standard of 2 percent of GDP, and even now they have not reached the 
demanded level of budgetary expenditures.226 Up to 2004 they were focused on accession to the EU 
                                                           
224
 Ibid., 6. 
225
 Chappel, What Future for , 5. 
226 James W. Peterson and Terry Hallmark, “The New NATO Members and the Mission in Afghanistan: Political 
and Economic Risks” (New Orleans: Paper Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political 
Science Association, 11 January 2008), 15.  
   
 
70 
structures and with the NATO enlargement they felt that they also come under the American 
protective umbrella.  
 
However, such recent circumstances as the Russian cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007, the bilateral 
agreement between Moscow and Berlin on building an under-sea gas pipeline, as well the 2008 
Russian invasion of Georgia emphasized to Central European countries that they still can not forget 
about possible conventional military threats in this part of Europe. Not to mention that V4 countries 
have a deep rooted historic fear of abandonment by the West. Doubtlessly, historical legacy in the 
case of V4 countries plays a pivotal role. Czechs do not forget that their sovereignty was sacrificed to 
appeasement policies preceding the World War II. Poles until now remember how they were left 
alone to face the onslaught of Germany and the Soviet Union, regardless of existing military alliances 
with France and security assurances from the United Kingdom. Hungarians and Czechs also 
experienced brutal military interventions organized by the Kremlin in 1956 and 1968 respectively.227   
 
A closer examination of the defense expenditures of V4 countries, even though they do not meet the 
NATO standard, reveals that Central European countries spend relatively more than their older allied 
countries.228 The budget of the Czech Ministry of Defense is estimated to about 56 billion CZK (about 
3.11 billion USD), which comprise only 1.37% of country’s GDP.229 Belgium spends on defense goals 
only 1.4% of its GDP in 2007, what was below the level of NATO’s average defense spending 
estimated to be about 1.73% in 2007 (excluding the U.S. expenditures). These figures were decreased 
because of Belgium’s budgetary difficulties in the hard times of financial crisis, reaching the level of 
less than 1% in 2010 as well as announced reduction to a 34,000-strong armed forces in 2012.230 
Hungary’s military expenditures in 2009 amounted to about 300 billion HUF (1.17% of Hungarian 
GDP), but Hungary planned to reach the level of 1.3% GDP by 2013.231 Portugal also has limited 
budget possibilities, thus its defense spending amounts to 1.54% of GDP.232 Slovakia’s military 
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expenditures are also under the level of 2% of GDP. In relation to the global economic crisis the 
Slovak Ministry of Defense budget was reduced from 1.045 billion EUR to 822 million EUR, or only 
1.22% of its GDP.233 Danish defense expenditures are amounted to be about 5.54 billion USD (1.7% of 
GDP).234 
 
The budget of the Polish Ministry of Defense in 2009 amounted to 24.86 billion PLN, estimated to be 
about 9 billion USD. The draft budget for 2010 proclaimed defense expenditures at the level of about 
25.5 billion PLN (what meets the statutory level of 1,95% of GDP from the previous year). Having in 
consideration that due to the financial crisis (and also remaining obligations from 2008 which had to 
be paid – 2.5 billion PLN), this figure for defense expenditures express an increase in comparison with 
the critical year of 2009.235 In turn Spain is regarded as an important member of the Alliance given it 
crucial geo-strategic position in the western part of the Mediterranean. Spain has a fully professional 
126,000 strong armed forces and is contributing to the NATO budget considerable means, which has 
allowed Spain to be rank seventh in the alliance (1.20% of GDP).236  
 
These results demonstrate that older NATO members have higher military spending as a percentage 
of GDP than V4 countries (except in the case of Poland in comparison to Spain). On the other hand, 
having in consideration troop deployment of individual countries in Afghanistan, this data shows also 
that V4 countries have allotted more money for the ISAF mission than NATO members with 
comparable size as a percentage of total military expenditures. According to the military 
expenditures of the greatest troop-contributing country of the V4 group, Poland, Polish Defense 
Minister Bogdan Klich declared that in 2010 final contracts within the Afghan package – a program of 
a special mode of purchases, carried out without offsetting conditions - the value of Afghanistan’s 
total package was estimated about 1.4 billion złotych (over 400 million in 2009 and about a billion in 
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2010). The maintenance of the contingent cost nearly 315 million złotych in 2009 and 374 million 
złotych in 2010.237  
 
3.1.2.1. The Costs of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Effort 
 
Stabilization of the situation inside Islamic Afghanistan requires not only the conduct of military 
actions but through the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, there is the development and reconstruction 
dimension where high expenditures are also demanded. Afghanistan is currently one of the largest 
consumers of international financial aid for rebuilding and reconstruction of the country. This aid is 
given by particular countries and also international institutions and organizations.238 A number of 
Central European countries’ non-profit organizations also play a role in humanitarian and 
reconstructions efforts in Afghanistan.  
These organizations are focusing on health, agriculture, education, health or security sector and 
public policy reforms. Since 2004 Afghanistan became an priority country in the Polish cooperation 
program for development. Only in 2006 within Polish development support was it planned to finance 
projects proposed by non-government organizations for a total sum of 1.6 millions Polish złotych. In 
2007 the Polish foreign aid program implemented through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allotted 8 
million PLN for Afghanistan, to be spent through the section of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) 
projects, with support of the Polish Embassy in Kabul and the Polish Military Contingent (PKW) in the 
operational area (as well as through the support of selected non-government organizations).239 In 
2010 Poland allotted 22 mln złotych for programs aimed at civil development for the Ghazni 
inhabitants.240 Poland has been actively involved in the process of creating democratic structures and 
reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan. In Afghanistan are present such Polish non-government 
organizations as Polska Akcja Humanitarna, Polska Misja Medyczna or Stowarzyszenie “Szkoły dla 
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Pokoju”.241 For instance, Slovakia continues supporting Afghan authorities through particular projects 
and programs within the area of the Official Development Assistance (ODA). Afghanistan was among 
13 priorities for the Slovak ODA mid-term strategy for the years 2003-2008. Until 2008, several 
projects were approved for Afghanistan by the Slovak Trust Funding Steering Committee and 
consumed over one million USD and anticipates spending more in the future. Slovak aid was allotted 
on strengthening Afghan social and business development, particularly building schools in rural 
areas, education projects aimed at girls and women, fostering a culture of small enterprises led by 
women, local TV coverage, capacity building and democratization and civil society support as well.242  
In turn Czech non-governmental organizations undertook activities at a school in the Afghan village 
of Itarchi. However, although Czech aid was not rejected, this support was a sensitive issue because 
only female members were permitted to work with Afghan females. The Czech Olivova Foundation 
supported projects aimed on improving children’s health in Afghanistan. The Foundation focused 
their activities on combating the problem of the lack of drinkable water in many places, which 
resulted in greater risk of infection. They also devoted a much of their work to support Afghan 
orphanages.243  
As a reliable member of NATO, Hungary conducts international development cooperation in 
Afghanistan. Budapest guaranteed one million USD aid at the Tokyo donor conference in 2002, and in 
the next few years disbursed the entire amount of money. From 2004 to 2006, Hungarian police 
officers provided help to the German Police Project Team in Kabul, and the Hungarian Interchurch 
Aid NGO helped to construct several schools in Balkh and Samangan provinces. Budapest also 
allotted 200,000 USD to the Afghanistan Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) in 2004.244 The 
establishment of the Hungarian PRT was accompanied by government aid for development projects 
in the amount of 500 million HUF per year. This sum (2 million EUR) was limited but on par with the 
previous development budget of the Dutch PRT – 5 + 1,6 million EUR allocated in two years for 
projects only in Baghlan. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked out this problem by 
seeking foreign investors who could aid their initiatives. Greece supported Hungary by offering 
800,000 EUR for non-military programs in Baghlan. Another case is the Hungarian Interchurch Aid 
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which with help from the Hungarian government applied to Japan’s Grass-Roots Human Security 
Project (GAGGP) and finally obtained in total 975,000 USD. The European Commision also supported 
Hungary with 800,000 EUR.245 
However, according to Peter Wagner here is a noticeable discrepancy between Hungary’s recent 
military and development budgets. Budapest spent 32.4 million EUR in 2009 to maintain its military 
presence, while for development spending disposed on 1.65 million EUR.246 Following the Obama 
administration’s declaration of December 2009 about increasing the number of American troops by 
34,000 in Afghanistan, Hungary offered also 200 more soldiers, while for development tasks no extra 
money was allotted.247 
 
The Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA) organized a conference at the end of 2009, 
where the most notable government officials and Afghan experts presented their opinion on 
Hungarian involvement in Afghanistan. Peter Wagner, an Hungarian analyst, summarized this 
conference in his paper as follows: “The global financial crisis hit Hungary hard. The government had 
to implement an austerity program which had an adverse effect on Hungarian development activities 
in Afghanistan. The PRT budget was cut back from 500 million to 459 million HUF. Moreover, due to 
the weak Hungarian economy, the national currency lost its value. In 2006 the 500 million HUF was 
worth 2 million EUR, but in 2009 this cut budget of 459 million HUF was equal to 1.63 million EUR. 
(The exchange rate was in 2006: 1 EUR = 250 HUF; in 2009: 1 EUR ≈ 280 HUF)”248 
 
In comparison to other nations, Visegrad group members’ contribution are modest, but of course not 
without any meaning. Additionally it is worth mentioning that these non-profit organizations are not 
considered by the Taliban and insurgents as a friendly or neutral forces supporting Afghani civilians, 
but as occupying military forces and they target them as frequently as they do regular armed forces.  




 In 2008 for realization of the civil development projects Hungary established an annual budget estimated at 
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3.1.3. Effectiveness of Engagement in Stabilization Tasks and Combat 
Operations 
3.1.3.1. Czech Republic 
During the visit of Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III to the Czech Republic, he discussed 
the ISAF operation in Afghanistan and the progress being made toward the transition of 
responsibility to Afghan authorities by the end of 2014. While meeting prominent Czech authorities, 
he thanked them for their armed forces’ vital contribution in the NATO ISAF mission (as well as in 
Kosovo and Iraq). “The professionalism of Czech troops and civilian specialists in Afghanistan is highly 
valued by allied command and staff, including ISAF Commander Army Gen. David H. Petraeus”, Lynn 
said. In addition Lynn applauded the so-called White Book on Defense, a plan for reforming and 
improving the Czech military and its defense procurement system, which should lead to increased 
possibilities for defense cooperation. He also mentioned that Americans had been able to assist the 
Czech forces with important support to their “training, communications modernization and air crew 
equipment”, emphasizing that the cooperation on the Washington-Prague line was particularly 
efficient in the helicopter operations and training area. Regarding helicopter activities, he added that  
“Not only is the Czech Republic preparing Afghan pilots as part of our NATO mission (…) we also are 
working together on several current and future projects that will expand both U.S. and Czech 
capabilities to support a range of potential missions.” Laid concluded his statements about American-
Czech cooperation in terms of expanding their partnership. “Together” he said, “I am confident we 
can meet the critical security challenges of the 21st century.”249 
 
The Czech daily Mlada fronta Dnes wrote how Czech soldiers from the Special Operation Group 
(SOG) lost the trust of British troops after pulling out from several missions by reason of heavy 
combat engagement; another time they refused to join the operation, saying “that too many of them 
were on leave”. According to the newspaper, encountering such an approach from Czech armed 
forces, British commanders were keen on co-operation with Danish troops. The Czech Republic’s 
defense minister, Vlasta Parkanova, initiated a close scrutiny into the contingent’s behavior, 
declaring that some of its members could be relegated. However, its commanding officer, Petr 
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Kcmar, asserted that such complaints are “nothing more than an excuse to dissolve the group, which 
operated under British command during a tour of Afghanistan that ended last year”.250 
3.1.3.2 Hungary 
When Hungarian troops were deployed to Baghlan Province in 2006, the security situation seemed to 
be stable. The Taliban presence was short-lived and only a few warlords posed a security threat in 
the Andarab Valley. Drug production was token and even decreasing since 2006, which led to the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime declaration of Baghan as a poppy-free area in 2009. As it become the 
Taliban’s target to expand the insurgency in the northern part of Afghanistan, Baghlan with its 
Pasthun minority also became the crucial object of intensive propaganda and anti-official actions. 
Anti -governmental actions especially increased after 2007. In the face of the growing insurgency 
movement, Budapest was operating under limited means to successfully combat anti-governmental 
forces. Owing the fact that the 240-strong PRT did not have a mandate to take active part in 
offensive combat actions, Budapest decided to enhance AFN capabilities through training and 
transfer of military hardware. A mutual Hungarian and American plan was proposed in 2008, when 
the Hungarian Minister of Defense and the US Ambassador to Hungary visited Baghlan province. 
Soon after, less than a year from that moment, ANA’s base settled down in Baghlan province with 
the help of funds coming from Washington. In the beginning of 2009 ANA kandak (battalion) and 
HUN – US OMLT were deployed.251 
These measures did not suppress the Taliban activities in province. Insurgents assumed control of the 
Baghlan Jadid, Dahan-e Ghori and Burqua districts. Central state power in fact have merely a 
theoretical presence in these areas. Moreover, police posts are constantly attacked and rebellions 
build provisional checkpoints and tax local inhabitants. Both insurgencies, in Kunduz and Baghlan 
provinces, are linked – the rebel forces in Kunduz take advantage of Baghlan Jadid for reinforcements 
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Here they are able to pull back after combat with the more offensively disposed German PRT and the 
AFS. The overall situation changed only with American reinforcements in the region.252 
Hungarian Defense Forces plays a highly esteemed role in NATO missions, and their activities are well 
regarded by allies, which in point of fact demonstrates Hungary’s leading role in several missions (in 
the SAF HUN PRT and at the Kabul International Airport). Moreover HDF member staff are frequently 
assigned to decisive positions at a growing number of NATO commands. In Gen. Kovacs opinion, 
“Unlike in the Balkans, consolidation is unfortunately out of the question in Afghanistan where the 
Hungarian Defense Forces’ largest and most dangerous mission is being conducted, and we have to 
prepare for a gradually deteriorating security situation in 2011 too”.253 
 
Budapest is criticized by NATO leaders predominantly for its lag in achieving force goals and 
integration, which can be affiliated to the three principal reasons: “over ambitious commitments 
before and after accession, continuous budget restrictions, internal political controversies and lack of 
social consensus”. Nevertheless, according to Admiral James G. Stavridis, NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, Hungary enjoys a good reputation as a strong and reliable ally of the NATO.254 
 
3.1.3.3. Poland 
In deploying its own forces to participate in the ISAF mission, Poland placed them at the disposal of 
the command of the operation without determining national restrictions. This allows for easier use of 
PWK in regions where the contingent will be necessary at any particular moment. It has particular 
importance in operation activities, because it allows for filling deficits in international forces in 
accordance to needs. A large number of countries participating in ISAF mission created national 
restrictions on their own forces, which hampers effective conduct of the mission. To a lesser extent, 
their also applies to countries who introduce for their own contingents national restrictions based on 
the lack of operational capabilities. Some activities undertaken in Afghanistan demand operating 
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during the night or in difficult climate conditions. Not all countries posses the appropriate equipment 
which make them incapable to fulfilling mission goals in such difficult mountain conditions.255 
 
The hardest criticism of Polish engagement in Afghanistan was contained in Time weekly magazine at 
the end of 2010. According to Time, when an American army battalion arrived to Ghazni province in 
summer 2009, they found Taliban who were resurgent in the area which they had pacified before 
they handed control to the Poles. An anonymous U.S. officer described how the Polish failure to 
patrol the critical roads between coalition bases lead to a situation whereby routes were “choked 
with roadside bombs”. From what was described in the article, it appeared that Americans did not 
perceive Polish engagement as one that could lighten their armed forces’ burden. Moreover, 
Americans claim that the Polish hierarchical approach to combat tasks is not appropriate when 
counter-insurgency campaign demands from mid and lower level officers to take real-time decision 
on the spot. They also criticize Poles for lack of continuity and that “logistics snafus make them 
dependent on U.S. support”.256 
 
Fortunately Americans and NATO quickly responded to the accusations coming from anonymous 
officers in the Time magazine. James G. Stavridis, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), stressed in a letter to the Polish Defense Minister that he absolutely does not agree with 
such an assessment of Polish troop activities in Afghanistan, emphasizing that Polish troops are well 
trained, experienced and devoted to the ISAF mission.257  
 
General David Petraeus, commander of the ISAF and commander of the U.S. Forces Afghanistan 
(USFOR-A) from July 4, 2010 to July 18, 2011, in his letter also mentioned that he commanded 
international forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in both missions spent much time with Polish 
soldiers and evaluated highly the combat capabilities of Polish armed forces. He also announced that 
during his last visit in Ghazni he was “very impressed of the excellent work of the Polish contingent 
(…) and their excellent relations with Afghan partners”. “In the past years, likewise in Iraq, Poland 
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had suffered heavy losses, but has never hesitated. “Therefore, all members of NATO in recent years 
acknowledged with applause that Polish authorities decided to increase its involvement in the 
mission”, added Patraeus, and ended the letter concluding that “all Poles should be proud of the 
tremendous effort of Polish soldiers in Afghanistan”. The U.S. General John F. Campbell, commander 
of coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan, also apologized to Klich for the anonymous comments of 
the U.S. military officers in Time.258 
 
Stanisław Koziej, head of the National Security Bureau, described the publication in the American 
magazine as an attempt to find guilty for the bad situation in Afghanistan. According to the head of 
the NSB it was good that there were apologies to the Poles for this publication because it “reflects 
the official, formal stand of the U.S. authority and command”. Koziej also added that such an article 
has to be treated seriously “as an attempt to frustrate American public opinion and attempt to 
review, find someone guilty, for why things go so badly (in Afghanistan), why clear vision has not 
been established”. NBS’ Chief also added that the article presents the basic dilemma which Poland 
has to face in Afghanistan – the dilemma of divergence of Polish contingent capabilities, operational 
capabilities and the scale and the nature of tasks needed to be performed there.259  
 
Regardless of these facts, the Polish contingent is much more active than all other V4 member 
countries and many other old NATO members. The value of Polish soldiers was particularly 
appreciated Bogdan Klich, Polis Defense Minister in 2007-2011: “The high efficiency especially 
pleased, because now they have less incentive to be in the field, because after all in comparison to 
October the number of enemy attacks has decreased. The soldiers stay outside the base, carry out 
patrols, intercept dangerous cargo, eliminate opponents who are often the leaders of the Taliban”. 
Klich also emphasized that since last year reconnaissance capabilities have dramatically improved. He 
mentioned that the first set of unmanned aerial reconnaissance aircraft, Scan Eagle, composed of 
five flying machines in the day and five at night (for the time being operated by Americans) were 
used in Spring 2010. The next set was launched in 2011.260 
 
                                                           






 PAP, Ile Kosztuje polaków Wojna w Afganistanie? 





According to American Charge d’Affaires Eddins Lauds Slovak, the government has listed a 
democratic and functioning Afghan country as a top priority and Americans are impressed with 
Slovak contributions to the ISAF mission. He noted that Slovakia provides financial support, non-
governmental organizations run projects in different areas in Afghanistan and Slovak families are 
active in distance-adopting to help Afghan children, which together make the international 
community aware and admiring of Slovakia’s effort to export its democratic experience to 
Afghanistan. Both NATO and the EU have recognized the threat of failing states such as Afghanistan 
as a threat to common security and, according to Lauds, “It is fitting that Slovakia – as a NATO ally – 
is doing its part in ISAF, and actively seeking to do more”. Lauds was also inspired the fact that 
common Slovaks are eager to help Afghans and share their difficult lesson of building democracy. The 
American Embassy in Slovakia cooperated with several Slovak organizations while they ran and 
implemented projects for Afghanistan. Among the most successful Slovak projects has been that in 
Peril since 2004, with the Afghan Women Resource Center, which has focused predominantly on 
“education for girls and women, income generation, civic rights, and community leadership”. Since 
2006 in Peril there has operated a “distance-adoption” scheme with the Afghan organization 
(Aschiana) and Slovak families have assisted in providing education for 55 children who had to work 
for their family’s living on the Kabul streets. “On Your Side”, a Slovak NGO affiliated with Handlova 
TV, carried out professional training for Kunduz regional television and the US Embassy in Slovakia 
provided support to journalists who gave “technical expertise and have also shown their Afghan 
colleagues how to do unbiased community reporting and maintain professional relationships with 
the local government.” In general in the words of Lauds, the international community acknowledges 
Slovak activities in Afghanistan: the government effort, military presence and non-governmental 
projects. Slovak troops contributed significantly in Afghanistan, in KAIA service, clearing mines, 
providing medical services and as well repairing runways. Slovakia is assisting in the rebuilding of civil 
society in Afghanistan. Lauds concluded that the Slovak presence in Afghanistan demonstrates that 
Slovakia has influence far beyond its borders. “And Slovaks and Afghans alike are better for that”.261 
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3.2. The Evaluation of the Mission in Home Countries - Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Participation in the Mission 
 
3.2.1. Public Opinion 
European authorities are guided and pressured by contrasting and paradoxical constituencies: the 
transatlantic – they acted in pursuance of solidarity and came after the US into Afghanistan after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks; and the other side of the coin - local political opponents, who contemplate 
Afghanistan as dispensable and treacherous warfare. According to Fabrice Pothier these factors to a 
certain degree explain the “schizophrenic” Afghan course of European countries with parliamentary 
democracies, where government policy approaches frequently hijack foreign policy agendas.262 In 
addition we should add other factors such as different national interest of particular states, the 
visible “crisis” of European integration or the lack of a common European defense and security 
policy. One of the most crucial factors for the conduct of  foreign policy by European NATO members 
is a public opinion support. 
 
Europe’s public support toward the United States and its foreign policy conduct has changed since 
the Bush administration left office. This shift to a more positive attitude toward the Obama 
administration was viewed as a test of how the ISAF mission in Afghanistan would be seen by 
worldwide opinion and whether the allies would continue to support it. Already examined data prove 
that Washington under Obama’s presidency had won the support from the allied leaders in terms of 
providing additional troops for NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan.263 While European allies 
responded to American demands to do more, in the meantime they were under increasing pressure 
from European voters to do less. Poll after poll, starting from major European countries as France, 
Germany and Great Britain, and ending with Central European countries, find respondents declaring 
they want their troops withdrawn from Afghanistan and less of their money spent for that mission. 
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According to Daniel Korski, the Afghan war, which initially was considered as a “forgotten war”, later 
become recognized as Europe’s unwanted war.264 
 
There is not a shadow of doubt that in Europe public support for the Afghan mission has been lost. 
Leaders in European capitals are deprived of inestimable “political oxygen” desired to maintain a 
long and efficient engagement. A Pew Global Attitudes Survey shows that European voters 
straightforwardly claim that the mission in Afghanistan is a failure and are opposing further troop 
deployment. In fact it is highly visible that public opinion is a beneficial reality for European 
governments that seek a “free-ride”. The Afghan stabilization mission is not a first concern for 
European citizens, but it is improbable that officials could be voted out of office over a remote war. 
The principal issues for voters have not changed as a result of Afghan war and they are still the same: 
unemployment, the economy and the cost of living.265 Moreover, unlike other NATO members, the 
mission in Afghanistan was not controversial during recent election campaigns in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and recently, in Polish parliamentary elections in 2011.266 
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According to the Transatlantic Trends 2009 survey (public opinion poll conducted by the German 
Marshall Fund of The United States on 14 thousands citizens in 14 European countries and the United 
States), after the first six months in office, Barack Obama almost turned back the slump in public 
support for the United States, which occurred in most European countries under the presidency of 
his predecessor. In mid 2009 Obama enjoyed greater support in Germany, Great Britain, and even in 
France than at home. Nonethless, twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, enthusiasm for 
Obama as political leader,  American leadership or the United States in general, has become much 
more shaded in East-Central Europe than in Western Europe. East-Central European opinion polls 
much less perceived U.S. global leadership as a desirable thing. Support for NATO was weaker than in 
Western Europe and fewer people believed in Obama’s capabilities to cope with global challenges. 
However, still more citizens of East-Central Europe than Western Europeans supported closer 
cooperation with Americans in the field of security, diplomacy and economy.267 To sum up the 
Transatlantic Trends in 2009, East-Central European citizens were less enamored with Obama than 
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those in Western Europe. Therefore countries which were considered as the most pro-American in 
Europe have recently become the least positive toward the United States and its foreign policy.  
 
Before examining the Transatlantic Trends of 2011, it is worth mentioning an interesting survey 
which was taken in Poland in relation to the Afghan stabilization mission issue. Poles critically 
evaluate the country’s engagement to NATO operation in Afghanistan. According to the Public 
Opinion Research Centre (CBOS), in September 2009 three-quarters of the Polish population (76%) 
opposed the participation of Polish soldiers in the mission, whereas only 20% were in favor.268 It is 
worth noting that in mid-2002, there more supporters of participation in the mission in Afghanistan 
than opponents.269 Polish public opinion not only does not support the participation of Polish soldiers 
in the mission in Afghanistan, but also disapproves such endeavors in essence. Moreover, Poles in 
comparison to another nationalities are characterized by critical attitudes regarding this issue. More 
than three-quarters of society (77%) believe that the NATO mission in Afghanistan has to be stopped 
now, while only one of six believe that the mission should be maintained.270 A majority of Poles (71%) 
doubted that the NATO forces’ effort might help to establish peace in Afghanistan. About the 
possibilities of ending the fighting in Afghanistan through the NATO mission, only 17% of 
respondents believe in such scenario.271 Such large skepticism of Poles toward the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan translates directly into disapproval of the participation of Polish soldiers within the NATO 
operation.272 
 
However, in regard to this year’s results of the Transatlantic Trends survey, Obama maintained high 
popularity in Europe.  An impressive proportion (75%) of surveyed populations of 12 EU member 
states approved Obama’s policy to cope with global challenges. Although support was less to some 
extent than in 2009, it was still higher than for George Bush in 2008 (about seven times higher in 
France and Germany and four times greater in the UK and Turkey). In addition to East-Central 
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European countries, Spain (68%) showed relatively less support in comparison with the EU average, 
along with Slovakia (58%), Bulgaria (63%), Poland (65%) and Romania(68%). Over the last year 
support for Obama increased in Poland by (7%), but decreased in another V4 group member, 
Slovakia, by 18 percentage points. Notwithstanding with the general approval of Obama’s foreign 
policy approach to face the international challenges, the data showed that Europeans are less in 
favor of specific foreign policies.273  
 
This year’s research showed that Poland, considered as a leader of the Central-European countries, 
despite initial skepticism, shows stability in the terms of pro-Atlantic and pro-European orientation. 
In 2011, 74 percent of Poles declared a positive or very positive opinion about the United States (72 
percent in the rest of the European Union). However it has to be mentioned that December 2010 
visit of Polish President Bronisław Komorowski and later Obama’s visit in Poland in May 2011, had a 
direct impact on such positive attitudes. Poles are keen on gestures and symbols, therefore they 
forgot about the issue of missile defense and anxiety associated to the reset of the U.S. policy toward 
Russia (this issue will be examined in a later part of this thesis chapter). Nevertheless, as it was 
already proved in the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) survey from September 2009, Polish 
public opinion was very critical of the U.S. actions in Afghanistan. In 2011, 61 percent of Poles still 
evaluated it negatively. Obama’s recent decision to withdraw 33,000 troops by September 2011, and 
to withdraw all troops together with other NATO member by the end of 2014, made critical 
assessments decline from 61 percent to 44 percent this year – to a level close to the average of the 
EU.274  
 
In addition to above information, the Transatlantic Trends 2011 surveys shows significant changes in 
European and American attitudes toward the Afghan stabilization mission. Until now we have 
observed a deep split between public opinion in the U.S. and the E.U in regard to the situation in 
Afghanistan and the future stabilization and reconstruction international efforts undertaken there. In 
2009, up to 56 percent of Americans looked optimistically on the possibility to stabilize Afghanistan, 
while only 32 percent of Europeans expressed a similar opinion. This year's research shows that the 
optimism of Americans has fallen to 41 percent, which approached the level of European optimism. 
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According to Michał Baranowski, an expert in the Warsaw office of the German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, the lack of a common transatlantic vision for the future of the NATO mission in 
Afghanistan had previously threatened the future role of the NATO. This year the difference between 
American and European public does not exist. 66 percent of Europeans and as many Americans want 
to reduce or withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. According to Baranowski, this is good news for 
the future of NATO.275  
3.2.2. Casualties 
One of the key threats for armed forces are casualties during the Afghan stabilization mission. In 
regard to statistics compiled by 21 Søndag from 2009, Denmark is the country which lost the most 
ISAF soldier per capita of population (3.8 soldiers killed). The figures showed losses of other major 
contributing countries and Canada’s losses were about 3.2, the United Kingdom’s at 2.3 and 
American were 2.1 per million of population.276 The explanation of such large losses came from the 
Peter Dahl Thruelsen, researcher of the Danish Defense Academy: “We have not restricted the 
operational areas of our soldiers like, for example, France, Germany, Spain and Italy who have said 
that they are prepared to take part [(E.: in ISAF)], but not where it really hurts” and Danish soldiers 
carried out operations in very dangerous Helmand province.   
 
Source: Personal calculations based on: http://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/facts-and-
figures/casualties/security-forces. Valid as of 15 February 2011. 
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As of as 15 February 2011, V4 casualties are low and such countries as Slovakia had not yet 
experienced casualties in Afghanistan. Other V4 countries casualties are not considerable in 
comparison to other coalition countries, however any losses have major political importance for 
countries participating in the ISAF mission. The Czechs are case in point of a new NATO member who 
particularly are concerned about threats to its military contingent. In April 2007, the Czech army had 
started operating in the mountains, in a remote area of Badakshan in the northeast part of the 
country. In the next month the vehicle which carried a Czech diplomat was fired upon. Although the 
diplomat was unhurt, his two bodyguards were wounded. A week later the growing threat was met 
with the first Czech military casualty. When heavy rains and flooding occurred in Fajzabad, landslides 
killed one Czech member of the local PRT, which found direct resonance at home. This “small” loss 
shocked not only the nation, but also the Czech military. While these accidents might be few in 
comparison to American losses, every casualty is accompanied by extensive media coverage which 
shows a hope to minimize all threats and keep away from any casualties at all.277 Such coverage is 
also visible in other Central European countries, and every loss negatively influences opinion polls, 
which demonstrate public desire to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. East-Central European 
countries public opinion is not accustomed to the fact that their soldiers are fighting somewhere in a 
distant country. Perhaps the East-Central European citizens are at the limits of their acceptance – as 
demonstrated in already examined data of public opinion polls on the mission in Afghanistan - after 
which they demand openly their own troops’ withdrawal. It seems that although Central European 
countries’ casualties, except for Poland, were really low in fact they were high enough to their 
citizens who indeed do not know what this war is about. Moreover, to add a new dimension to the 
problem, it is worth noting Polish car accidents, where in 2008 alone died 5,437 people. 278 The death 
of every soldier or civilian in Afghanistan is a big tragedy, however I want only accentuate that if the 
opinion polls were more conscious about the aim of the ISAF mission - or less submissive to media 
coverage - we could be able to assess the acceptable number of casualties for a particular country. 
However right now it seems that no matter how many casualties occur, if 100 or 10 soldiers will die 
in Afghanistan, the citizens feelings will be the same and they will increase particular countries’ 
motives to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.  
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3.2.3. The Terrorist threat 
Before 9/11, somebody who would claim that Central European countries were at risk of terrorist 
attack might have been regarded as insane. The same thesis, stated right after the terrorist attacks 
on the United States, would be reasonably considered as unfounded and alarmist. However, ten 
years after the terrorist attacks such a statement would not be longer be something unusual.279 As a 
result of Central European countries’ support for the United States policy and active participation in 
the ISAF mission (and Iraqi mission as well), V4 countries developed into a central target for those 
who oppose the mission in Afghanistan. In particular, given the central role of Washington as the key 
enemy for the terrorist forces, Central European countries become indistinguishably affiliated to the 
“war on terror”, and also attached to broader American interest in the region.280 To paraphrase 
Bogdan Klich, however in a negative context, indeed flags of Central European countries become 
visible in Afghanistan for those who were targeted as an enemy of American and NATO – the forces 
of local and global jihad.281  
However, in fact Central European countries has never been a primary preoccupation of Al-Qaida, 
although Europe experienced the occasional attention of terrorist organizations (train bombing in 
Madrid in March 2004, and transportation system in London in July 2005). In the statement “To the 
Peoples of Europe” former Al-Qaida leader, Osama bin Laden, singled out the continent and offered a 
peace proposal to European countries which would cease hostilities toward Muslims and stop their 
involvment in Muslim affairs. Bin Laden also presented in his statement the justification for 
undertaking terrorist acts and killing those who invaded or occupied Muslim countries: “Reality 
confirms we are right . . . For we have only killed Russians after they invaded Afghanistan and 
Chechnya. We only killed Europeans after they invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, and we only killed 
Americans in New York after they supported the Jews in Palestine and Invaded the Arabian peninsula, 
and we only killed them in Somalia after they invaded it in Operation Restore Hope. We restored them 
to hopelessness, thank God”.282 Presumably the increased level of engagement and activity carried 
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out by V4 countries within the ISAF operation might escalate an animosity and hatred by jihadist 
networks, especially as those nations carry out more frontline or battle responsibilities.283 
The various events which have occurred since 9/11 made the terrorist threat from jihadists more 
possible to occur because of several factors. It is estimated that Al-Qaida operates in at least 15 
European countries, and the terrorist attacks in Spain and England proved the existence of fringe 
groups associated with Al-Qaeda and that individual Islamists are capable to carry out attacks in 
European capitals. Moreover, terrorist experts emphasizes that the Al-Qaeda network has splintered 
and morphed into a different kind of organization and the terror methods and tactics constantly 
change, aiming at new and different targets.284 The V4 countries accession to the EU and the further 
implementation of the Schengen treaty meant that Central Europe has opened itself to the free 
movement of capital, goods and people from the Western European countries, and especially those 
where terrorist networks are well based in the underground (Germany, France, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands – countries where Central European nations are keen to emigrate and might come into 
contact with terrorist networks). Moreover, citizens of those countries found an opportunity to 
penetrate Central European countries, and now it has become more complicated to control these 
who might potentially pose a risk or undertake suspicious activity in the Central European 
countries.285  
Therefore, Visegrad member countries might become a new targets of terrorist organizations if their 
presence on Afghan soil remains active and countries already hit by terrorists (Spain, England) 
undertake counterterrorism measures, which simply makes V4 countries easier targets for terrorists. 
The question is, given the psychology of terrorists, is there any distinction being made by those who 
are able to terrorize NATO members, between both the “old” and “new” Europe and between NATO 
members ? Even owing to the fact, that V4 countries would constitute softer targets for terrorist 
organizations with Al-Qaeda at the head, why would they attack in Central Europe if more intriguing 
targets are still associated with Western European countries – the “old” Europe. But this might 
change when such countries like Poland and Ukraine will be organizing European Championships in 
2012.286  
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Such events as the co-organization of the European Championships in football by Poland can 
significantly raise the level of risk, simply because international mass sport events are particularly 
good targets for terrorist actions. It should be noted that especially in the case of Poland the 
consciousness of terrorist threat for those who are responsible for national security has changed 
significantly over the past years.287 Moreover, again in case of Poland, the close cooperation by Poles 
with the U.S. intelligence and as a result the discovery of the so-called “secret prisons” of the CIA on 
Polish territory results in higher risk of terrorist threat. In these prisons were held the most important 
commanders of Al Qaeda, captured around the world, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 
alleged “architect” of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Straying from the fact whether it was 
true or not, the media coverage on a global scale made Poland directly assigned to the place where 
Al Qaeda prisoners were tortured by CIA officers and it is hard to imagine an effective campaign to 
vanish such linkages to Poland. Thus, once again, we can assume that for weakened jihadist planners 
Poland and other Central European countries can be easier targets than Western European 
countries.288 
To sum up, the arising terrorist threat for V4 countries is a direct consequence of conscious decisions 
taken by the governments of particular countries aimed at increasing the importance of V4 countries 
on the world stage and realization of their “raison d’etat”. The threat of the global terrorism has 
increased significantly owing the fact that V4 countries are holding the mass sport events, but also 
they have run the EU presidency and have hosted a number of EU events on their territories. It would 
be even more than naïve to deny that the outcome of the mission will bring a possible terrorist 
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3.3. The New Shape of the American – Central European “Special 
Relationship” 
 
Due to their engagement in the military operations and contribution to NATO’s military and defense 
capabilities development, Poland and other V4 countries have constructed the image of responsible 
members of the international community. Nevertheless, it is assumed that investment of troops and 
money did not translate into change of relations with the USA in particularly sensitive areas, as 
expected by Central European governments.290 
As noted in the beginning of the previous chapter, as former Soviet vassals, Central European states 
demonstrate two fundamental needs - security and economic development. Starting with the 
security issue, they sought for a protection against historic enemies in the region, almost entirely 
Russia, owing the fact that Germany is no longer considered as a possible conventional aggressor. 
Central European politicians are aware that the only country who might provide such security is the 
United States. On the other hand, seen from the economic development perspective, the EU on the 
whole is natural source of subsidizes; still the relationship between “East” - “West” Europe is not 
ordinary. As believed by Michael Radu, even if the military contribution of nations from both sides of 
Europe pale significance compared to any activities Washington may carry out, the economic 
correspondence is more tangled. In fact Central Europeans need EU investment and aid, but recent 
years after their accession show that the EU also need East European markets and labor. On that 
account security correlation is far more asymmetric than the economic bonds.291 Not to mention 
unquantifiable belief, so ubiquitous in Central Europe, that throughout the hard years of communist 
misery it was the United States who, at least rhetorically, were firmly on the anti-communist side. 
Central Europeans were prodigiously thankful for the indomitable anti-communism embodied in 
President Ronald Regan, and saw the United States as the foremost guarantor of their independence 
from the Soviet Union’s successor, Russia, after the collapse of communit system in 1989. 




291 Michael Radu, Old Europe vs. New, Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-notes (March 12, 
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Furthermore, it was Washington’s pressure that saw Central-Eastern European countries accessed to 
NATO in 1999.292 
When in 2003 Bush’s administration undertook a political drive for worldwide support to launch 
military action against Saddam Husain’s dictatorial rule, eight countries (five EU members - Denmark, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK, and three new NATO members - Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland) signed a declaration in Madrid reassuring the United States’ of their support on Iraq.293 The 
nature of the Central European countries commitment was unambiguous, especially owing the fact 
that they challenged the shaded threats and disdain of French President Jacques Chirac and publicly 
supported Washington’s policy.294 Being aware of fact occurred at a time when Central-Eastern 
European countries still were not a members of the EU, showed region’s independence and growing 
confidence of their political establishments.295 
The Bush administration had valued Central-Eastern European countries for their military 
commitment to the Iraqi and, later on, in the Afghan mission. Likewise their special cooperation on 
missile defense project and the region’s advocacy for the NATO and EU integration of Georgia and 
Ukraine were applauded. The missile defense project was an issue of crucial importance in that it 
made the Czech Republic and Poland major partners in countering ballistic missile proliferation, and 
would also have framed a special bilateral security relationship with Washington. However, Bush’s 
administration made a mistake by identifying East-Central European countries as a “New Europe” 
and distinguishing them from the “Old Europe”, with which the United States had been allied since 
the beginning of the Cold War. The political division of the Old Continent became again highly visible 
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and strained the region’s relationship with its Western neighbors on the eve of the European Union’s 
first big enlargement to the East. By focusing a centre of activity in Central-Eastern Europe for its 
political agendas against strong opposition from allied capitals as Berlin and Paris, Bush’s 
administration simply affronted major “Old European” nations. Moreover, by granting a special 
relationship to a Central European leader, Poland, on NATO enlargement and missile defense, 
Washington again directly argued Moscow.296 
When the new American administration declared it will be on the lookout for a “reset” in relations 
with Russia, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe became wary of the new US leader’s 
overtures to their greatest historical enemy from the East. They wondered whether the new 
American policy approach to Russia would also impact their relationship with Washington and 
downgrade them in favor of better cooperation with Kremlin.297 
3.3.1. The United States Shifting Agendas 
The Obama administration had to shoulder responsibility for conduct of foreign policy when tough 
global challenges and problems exceeded the ability of the contemporary hegemonic country to 
handle them on its own. The new establishment in Washington understood from the beginning that 
Obama would need all the help he could obtain on difficult issues like Afghanistan, Iran’s effort to 
possess weapons of mass destruction, or to put a stop to global warming. To put it another way, 
Obama needed a strong and united Europe as a partners and had to get the Kremlin to not play the 
role of “spoiler”. These objectives largely shaped the intellectual approach of Obama’s program 
toward the continent and Russia.298  
When the new policy approach was put into practice several shortcomings appeared. The most 
important was the implementation of Obama’s administration policy immediately pairing, supposed 
to be separated, polices, one toward Russia, the offer to map out a “reassurance” approach towards 
Central-Eastern European countries. According to Jeff Lightfoot a sequence of poor diplomatic work 
by the Obama administration to a great degree insulted the countries of the region, even preceding 
the bungled rollout of the new missile defense program. Nonetheless, in his opinion Washington 
might be forgiven for creating sour feelings in the Central-Eastern region. Especially when “Poland’s 
paranoia” made its occasionally not the easiest ally and the Czech Republic’s poor performance of its 
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Presidency of EU complicated faith in the region’s leadership. Moreover, at that time, President 
Vaclav Klaus’s delaying tactics on the Lisbon Treaty appeared symptomatic when Washington sought 
to employ the continent as a more effective global partner and closest ally.299 
3.3.1.1. The American September Affronts and the Missile Defense Case 
As September 11 has historical meaning for the U.S., for Central Europeans citizens the first of 
September symbolizes the start of World War II. Since the 70th anniversary of this event, to some 
scholars this day marks also the end of period of special relationship between Warsaw and 
Washington. The heads of the state from Europe jostled for space at the place where the opening 
shots of WWII were fired. Near the Gdansk memorial were gathered such notable politicians as 
German chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian Prime minister Vladimir Putin. Among them stood 
Gen. James Jones, the US national security adviser. For Poles, to whom this event had a huge 
symbolic meaning, the inadequate priority given by Obama’s administration by designating national 
security adviser was a sign of United States’ shifting agendas. The new American administration was 
focused on the aftereffects of the global financial crisis, terminating war in Iraq and giving higher 
priority to the one in Afghanistan, in the meantime keep under observation China, North Korea and 
Iran – not to mention Obama’s effort to reform American health care system.300 On the authority of 
Daniel Rotfeld, a former Polish foreign minister, “the US has acknowledged that the transformation 
of Europe was a success and that there is no need to be occupied with this region”. Under Obama’s 
presidency the shift in views become apparent, that the US was no longer concerned about regions 
like Central Europe, which do not require immediate attention, which than revealed a noticeable 
cooling in pro-American opinion in conducted surveys in Central Europe. Poles supported George W. 
Bush’s foreign policy approach more than the majority of other remaining countries in the world, 
including the United States. While Western Europeans shuddered at Bush’s conduct of foreign policy, 
they became highly supportive for Obama’s approach. In contrast Central Europeans displayed a 
reverse attitude (as was already mentioned the Transatlantic Trends poll indicated in 2009, only 55 
percent of Poles supported Obama, the lowest level in Europe – for instance at the same time 88 
percent of the French favored Obama).301 
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Perhaps the decision over who was to be sent to Gdansk commemoration could be acknowledged as 
solely symbolic, if it were not connected to more substantial decisions demonstrating the US 
disengagement from Central Europe. The most controversial issue of the US – Central European – 
Russian triangle of relations at the end of the first decade of XXI century, was the American plan to 
locate the missile interceptors in Poland with linked radar in the Czech Republic. The Bush 
administration defended the necessity of the shield by the existence of so called “rogue states”, for 
example Iran, in the general neighborhood of the continent. The Czech Republic and Poland, chosen 
for the sites together with other countries of the “new” Europe, gave decisive support to United 
States policy in the early days of the Iraq war. Nevertheless, Czech and Polish publics feared that the 
building of anti-missile infrastructure on their territory together with involvement in Afghanistan and 
Iraq would only anger more terrorists and simply invite terrorists attacks.302 
During the presidency of George W. Bush, the Poles were tough negotiators trying to locate the 
stationing of a battery of Patriot missiles in return for allowing the location of an American missile 
interceptor base on Polish territory. The idea of missile interceptors’ emplacement together with a 
battery of Patriots in Central Europe naturally brought Russia into the cauldron which perceived this 
program as a potential threat, and provoked anxiety among Czech Republic and Poland’s European 
Union allies.303 President Putin several times suggested that they could use different location, 
offering for example an existing Russian radar station in Azerbaijan, or he simply threatened to build 
own facility and even reminded Prague and Warsaw that Russia will threaten them by aiming their 
ballistic missiles on them. Discussions in the Czech Republic and Poland in part concentrated on the 
manner of approving or disapproving the installation of American military infrastructure. One of the 
possibilities was to undertake a national referendum in both countries, which could have lead to a 
populist campaign against it. The other way of solving the issue was a submission to both chambers 
of the Polish and Czech legislature for ratification.304 
Whether the Russian threat had anything to do with Polish and Czech involvement in the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan is hard to prove, but indeed it reveals another dimension of the uncertainty in 
Czech and Polish closeness to Washington policy. Concessions to Moscow made by Americans did 
not satisfy Russia, even as Americans indicated that only an attack by Teheran would launch the 
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missile system in Central Europe. More controversial were American proposals to allow Russian 
personnel to access the military infrastructure on Czech and Polish soil, to end their doubts about the 
aim of the system. That proposal alienated both V4 countries who still remember the Soviet 
occupation of their countries.305 
The initial drift by Obama’s administration in its policy had worried Central European leaders who 
decided to send a letter to Washington emphasizing that the missile defense program would be 
considered as a litmus test of the significance the United States places on its relationship with Central 
Europe.306 Into the bargain the letter made Washington aware that it needed to make much more 
effort if it wanted to keep close ties with Central Europe, by reason of the fact that a new generation 
of leaders coming to power was far from being strongly pro-American.307 Indeed, when the new 
American administration abandoned missile defense plan on September 17 in the name of better 
Russian-American partnership, Central European governments regarded that as a devaluation of 
strategic role of this region. It is worth noting that this low point of the American – Polish relationship 
occurred at a day which has extraordinary meaning for Poles – it was a 70th anniversary of Soviet 
invasion of Poland during the Second World War and was interpreted either as extreme clumsiness, 
or an affront from the Yankees.308 Under Polish prime minister Donald Tusk and the new generation 
of Central European leaders, in particular in V4 countries, this gave new impetus to V4 countries to 
reconsider their foreign policy toward Berlin and Moscow.309 
3.3.2. Central European “Reset Button” 
 
President Barack Obama’s advisors noticed that they committed a number of missteps toward 
Warsaw and other East-Central European capitals. Therefore Obama decided to pay a visit to 
Warsaw in May 2011 and tried to wipe out his administration’s mistakes toward faithful allies in this 
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particular region of the world. As usual in such visits there were many compliments in regard to 
Poland as a European state which avoided the recent economy crisis, as a leading country of this part 
of Europe, and also a perfect model of successful transition to democracy for the Arab countries. 
Obama knew that dealing with the very sensitive Poles, most important are gestures and symbols. 
Hence, during his nearly 23-hour visit, he laid wreaths three times and met with representatives of 
Polish democracy which was aimed to build a positive image of the visit and to satisfy the Polish 
political class. Although the visit had clearly symbolic meaning, indeed it created Polish pride against 
the background of the East-Central European region. Although these complements were authentic, 
they were also directly addressed to fulfill simple Polish emotional needs to be appreciated by other 
states and especially the “modern Rome”, which undoubtedly is reflected in today’s Washington.310  
However, it seems that Central European countries have resigned from the minimalistic approach to 
diplomacy – where success was considered by bringing to the table worldwide leaders of strategic 
importance. Indeed, entering into the second decade of the XXI century, Poland and Central 
European countries started assessing the meetings through the prism of particular agreements and 
their final positive outcomes for the national interest.311 Instead of the role of “advance base” of 
Washington’s foreign policy, Warsaw in the XXI century has found two different solutions to its 
position on the geopolitical scene – try to go through reconciliation process with Moscow on the 
ground of pragmatic mutual interests and increasing closer cooperation with Germany. Czech 
governments also had to chose between an acceptable position between Berlin and Moscow, or 
make an effort to cope with the political demands of being Washington’s “bridge-head” in Central 
Europe. The highly motivated engagement of Warsaw and Prague in the American missile defense 
plans reflected the divergence in security perceptions between the “southern” and “northern” wing 
of the V4 countries. The Czech Republic and Poland tended to strengthen the Trans-Atlantic agenda 
in Europe against the German-Russian cooperation and additionally to gain strength in negotiations 
with the EU. Hungary, shifted toward a positive attitude toward Germany and a “cross-party Atlantic 
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commitment”, whereas Hungarian political parties represent different attitudes toward policy 
against Russia, which has not refused the interest-driven cooperation.312 
Analyzing precisely the Polish case, this country has undergone in recent years the most vivid change 
– from a tiresome country tending to undertake tactless behavior to confront major EU countries, 
such as Germany, to a pragmatic team player who is ready to adopt leadership responsibilities within 
EU and NATO.313 During the Kaczyński brothers’ era, 2005-2007, Poland was particularly 
confrontational in the EU and the Atlantic cooperation was a core of Polish foreign policy.314 The 
attitude to foreign policy changed when pro-business and centrist party, Civic Platform, won 
parliamentary elections in 2007.315 Jarosław Kaczynski’s successor, Prime Minister Donald Tusk, also 
shared theses values but in addition decided on a more open and pragmatic policy approach toward 
the major European countries (Lech Kaczynski served as president until April 2010, when he died in a 
dramatic plane crash). One of the key changes implemented by Tusk’s government was to improve 
relations with the crucial EU members, Germany and France, as well as major non-member countries 
pivotal for economic interests such as Russia. If truth be told, animosities against Germany and 
Russia are still strong in Poland; nonetheless Tusk has made efforts to go beyond those animosities, 
often abandoning the anti-German rhetoric from the Kaczynski times and has developed a great 
relationship with German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.316   
The new generation of Polish politicians would rather based the country’s relations with Russia on a 
mutual interest agenda with great potential than on a confrontational approach which does not give 
any economic benefits. Germany is the most important supporter of Poland, and to a lesser extent, 
other Visegrad group countries. When Guido Wasterwelle was appointed as the new foreign minister 
in Germany, he decided, before visiting Paris, to pay his first official visit abroad to Warsaw, which 
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symbolized the special strategic importance of Poland to Germany.317 Poland understood that it is 
better to have Germany on its side than pointlessly oppose the largest EU member. According to 
Bartek Nowak, executive director of the Centre for International Relations in Warsaw, “we (Poland) 
understood and implemented in practice the old adage, that you can achieve a lot with Germans, but 
nothing opposing them (…) therefore we implemented it – basically, in every policy we try to consult 
with Germans and have them on our side”.318  
Donald Tusk’s foreign policy approach also demonstrated that the pragmatic policy toward Russia is 
even possible from Poland, a country considered as the most anti-Russian state among the V4 
countries and within the EU as well. 319 When Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin together with 
Tusk paid tribute to the Polish military officers murdered by Soviets in the Katyń forest in April 2010, 
it was acknowledged as the first considerable step into the normalization of the Polish-Russian 
relationship. Unfortunately, a few days later one of the biggest Polish national tragedies occurred, 
when Lech Kaczynski died in a plane crash in Russia on his way to another ceremony to honor victims 
of Katyń.320 Real and heartfelt sympathy from the Russians contributed to a further warming of 
Polish-Russian relations, although this thaw also had some critics.321 Regardless, in terms of relations 
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with Russia, Poles learned that they can achieve much more through a less emotional and historically 
saturated foreign policy approach. As Nowak stated, “we found that we are less effective while we 
are considered in EU as the Cold War warrior against Russia, because for many EU members the 
relations with the Russia are pivotal”. Achieving better relations with Russia posses also has an 
indirect impact on Polish-French relations, since Paris considers Moscow as an indispensable partner. 
322 
After a series of mutual gaffes and missteps, America’s relations with Central and Eastern Europe 
needed their own ‘reset button.’ The US Vice President, Joe Biden, emphasized in his remarks in 
Bucharest that in contemporary worldwide conditions Washington looks for what it can do with East-
Central Europe, instead of what it can do for the states from this particular area of the world.323 
However, it seems that Americans should slowly get used to the inevitable day when Poland and 
other Central European countries will oppose Washington’s political, economic or military projects. 
And it will not be associated to Central European resentment towards Washington’s foreign policy, 
but a sign of the times of independence and maturity of V4 countries in international politics.324 The 
image of Poland as a state willing to cooperate with major European countries improved its position 
within the EU and restored Polish dreams that the "Weimar Triangle" - composed of France, 
Germany and Poland - might be a powerful locomotive of growth and the Polish leadership position 
of the East-Central European region will be consolidated. The credibility of Poland within the EU was 
also strengthened when Warsaw successfully overcame the financial crisis of 2008/2009, and showed 
a positive growth even in 2011/2012 when many other European economies had been shaken in 
their foundations.325 The Polish government often tends to use a phrase that the country is a “green 
island” on the “red sea” of an economic crisis.326  
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Only 7 years has passed when Visegrad group member countries, together with other East-Central 
and outhern European states, joined the European Union. The majority of them were a “refugees” 
from the Soviet bloc and their accession was a fulfillment of all promises – seemed to be unrealistic 
in the 1990s - made by Western countries, that they could join Western political structures. After the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, the EU enlarged to the current number of 27 
states. The newcomers were perceived by Western capitals as a risky ground to cope with the 
common market issues. Many European notables wondered if they would respect the EU principles 
or interfere in future projects. But who could have predicted that in 2011 Brussels would be 
wondering about Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and at the moment also about Italy, and that 
Poland during its Presidency within the EU will be presenting solutions to the current problems 
through an historical perspective and assure others that the European project has a bright future.327   
Therefore, while the United States is changing its priorities to face the challenges of the XXI century, 
Visegrad member group countries will seek support in regional structures such as the European 
Union. The attitude of the Central European countries to the EU has become more and more positive 
- according to a recent survey, 83% of Poles said that joining the bloc was beneficial for the country. 
It is expected that during its 6-month presidency, Poland will promote its traditional agenda of 
integrating the countries beyond the eastern border of the EU, such as Ukraine and Georgia. Poland 
was one of the driving forces behind the EU's Eastern Partnership program and wishes to enter into 
an agreement with Ukraine on a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA).328 Even the faith 
of Central European countries that NATO will ensure security in the region seems to have moments 
of doubt. After all, Polish efforts for American military presence on its own territory, in fact is nothing 
else than a manifestation of lack of confidence in regard to guarantees contained in NATO’s Article 
5.329  
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According to Zbiniew Pisarski, for President Barack Obama and American politicians, Poland and 
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe are in the second league, treated less by the optics of 
bilateral relations and more by regional dimension. The positive factor of this dimension is that in this 
second league Poland is the leader of a table.330 Moreover, the metamorphosis of Warsaw into a 
cheerleader of Central and Eastern Europe allows Poland to present and cheer on others to act, pose 
for photos, but still remain outside the main arena of the global politics game. It's time to show to 
the world, which perfectly knows and takes advantage of Polish weaknesses for gestures, symbols 





























The 10th anniversary of American intervention in Afghanistan became a perfect opportunity to 
undertake research linked to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. However, the adopted approach of this 
research differs considerably from the existing ones. As a resident of Poland - the largest Central 
European country - I found it interesting to undertake a project that directly addresses a large gap in 
the literature on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which is the Central European countries 
participation in the Afghan stabilization mission. In regard to the formulated goals of this study, the 
V4 countries’ participation in the ISAF mission was examined within the international framework of 
this mission. 
The end of the Cold War left NATO in a vacuum. The Alliance had to determine its position and new 
mission to legitimize its existence. To be up to challenge in the XXI century required appropriate 
remedies; thus NATO tried to undertake a concerted effort to respond to recognized challenges and 
provide solutions. Therefore the ISAF mission in Afghanistan became for large number of scholars the 
greatest contemporary challenge in NATO’s existence. As the American Republican Senators said, 
NATO in the XXI century either had to go “out-of-area” or out of business.332 Indeed, as international 
forces have faced ever greater problems in Afghanistan, NATO’s mission become acknowledged as a 
real test of its prestige and ability to conduct out-of-area military operations on a large scale, 
corresponding to the threat posed by a new type of asymmetric conflict.  
 
The beginning of the operation had not brought worries to U.S. and NATO leaders. In the initial stage 
before and during the operation, when V4 countries’ contribution was the smallest, Western 
strategists planned successful combat operations and short-term reconstruction and humanitarian 
efforts. There was a visible consensus among Western policy-makers that the purpose of Afghan 
intervention was to defeat Al-Qaeda militarily and to oust the Taliban regime, which had provided Al-
Qaeda protection. Afghanistan was regarded by the American administration as a ‘failed state’, and 
ascribing such a definition to Afghanistan was equivalent to perceiving such conditions as the 
grounds for the existence a “safe haven” for terrorist organizations in the first place. As a result, the 
long-term aim of the stabilization mission was to clear the way for Afghanistan to become an 
economically self-sufficient, politically stable and reasonable state so as to change conditions for the 
future existence of terrorist organizations. Despite initial military success (or its delusion  as has 
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already been discussed in the first chapter of the paper), international forces have from year to year 
increasingly encountered assaults by re-emerging Taliban armed groups. The problem was that the 
implementation of counterterrorist and reconstruction efforts into a coherent, common 
international strategy approach was contested. Coalition member states faced the problem of 
insufficient political support and coordination, which basically was the main obstacle to translating 
military success into a similarly successful reconstruction effort with the long-term goal of sustaining 
stability.333 
 
Long before Barack Obama became a president of the United States, American and NATO leaders 
had been already aware that stabilization mission of Afghanistan would not be a quick and painless 
process and the military activities had to be followed by a long-term effort and supported by 
sufficient financial effort. They were also conscious that what was possible at the beginning now had 
become very difficult to achieve. The lack of troop strength during the Bush era was one of the major 
obstacles to accomplishing the mission in Afghanistan. Therefore, the burden-sharing complexity also 
affected alliance results, especially the commitment to NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General 2004-2009, emphasized in January 2009 the need for allied 
countries “to step up, with more forces… It is fair, and I think politically healthy, if we have a fair 
balance of burdens in this mission between the Allies”. Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, also 
appealed to NATO members to fulfill their promises for more troops within ISAF in Afghanistan. He 
expressed his opinion to the Senate Armed Services Committee in early 2008, stressing that he had 
become frustrated when allies had not lived up to their pledges in the ISAF:  “I worry a lot about the 
alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in which you have some allies willing to fight and die to 
protect people’s security, and others who are not”.334 In response to the request of the United States 
and NATO, the international community has decided to increase its commitment to the ISAF mission. 
Given the recent, relatively large number of V4 countries’ forces in comparison to older NATO 
members on the ground in Afghanistan, particularly given the tasks they face, the Afghan 
stabilization mission developed into a new challenge for Central European countries in the XXI 
century, and probably the most important and the most difficult mission for Central European armed 
forces.335 
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Visegrad group member countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia - chosen to be 
examined in this paper, in regard to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan demonstrate all the hallmarks of 
treating it with the same level of importance. My analysis proves that it is in the interest of Central 
European countries to strengthen the Alliance and participate in the constant validation of its 
political and military credibility. The fundamental role of NATO in Central European countries’ 
security results from basic strategic documents related to common defense. Therefore, to put it 
simply, the success of the operation will confirm the credibility and strengthen the cohesiveness of 
the Alliance. The failure of the NATO-led ISAF mission would weaken the Alliance, and de facto, one 
of the pillars of Central European security.336 However, in such complex missions as this one in 
Afghanistan, where the potential benefits are hard to articulate and when high domestic political 
costs exist, it would have been difficult for NATO to block the reasonable motives for a “free-ride” 
regarding the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. First, because of increased casualties and lower public 
support for the mission since the beginning of operation. Secondly, due to the complexity of the 
mission and the distance from Europe. It is hard to explain to public opinion how the mission is linked 
to a country’s national interest.337  
The findings of this paper have showed that although V4 countries’ troop contribution lagged in the 
early phase of the ISAF mission, with the passing of time they have shared fairly the burden of 
responsibilities in Afghanistan. The initial level of contribution to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan to 
some scholars might have been considered “free-riding” behavior however, the lack of commitment 
was constrained, especially in case of Poland, by involvement in the Iraqi mission.338 Moreover, V4 
countries did not deploy forces to Afghanistan only because of allied obligations but also because of 
national interest and pragmatic reasons. Such considerable contributions by V4 countries come from 
their aspiration to authenticate their reputation as a reliable allies. Once a new alliance member 
achieves a reputation for meeting its commitments, it becomes easier for the country to intensify its 
level of coordination within NATO. In addition, the Afghanistan mission provides a valuable 
experience for the Central European armed forces in unaccommodating real combat conditions, 
command procedures and test of their military equipment,  which enables them to increase their 
degree of modularity while gaining considerable experience in cooperation with international forces. 
This experience prepares Central European Armed Forces for the new challenges and threats to their 
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security in the region and from distant regions of the world. Moreover, participation in the ISAF 
mission demanded from V4 countries to upgrade and professionalize their own forces and adapt 
them to participation in new out-of-area missions – probably without participation in the NATO ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan (and Iraqi mission in the case of Poland) it would have consumed much more 
time. Therefore, active participation in the Afghanistan mission has boosted modernization processes 
in Central European armed forces, which they had not been able to introduce since their accession to 
NATO. Therefore, this phenomenon directly strengthens Central European armed forces defense and 
combat capabilities.339 
Further, one of the interesting findings from this paper concerns the region’s growing  independence 
and the boost in confidence of the V4 countries’ political establishment since NATO’s enlargement of 
the end of XX century. It appears that V4 countries have also learned that possible threats might 
come not only from the East, but they have grown to understand the complexity of global security 
threats also from a sub-region of the world, which has to be linked the Central European area. As 
Janos Martonyi, Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, emphasized - collective security is the 
fundamental issue for the NATO member countries if they want to successfully face the challenges of 
the XXI century.340 However, between political circles and public opinion there exists a visible split 
over the advisability of sending Central European armed forces to distant Afghanistan. Therefore as 
the examined data in this thesis shows, citizens of Central Europe regularly raised the question of 
losses and profits from participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.  
The undertaken analysis shows that V4 member countries indeed had and have a deep desire to 
establish their reliability to the United States and their European allies. Prior to the 2004 EU 
enlargement, V4 countries were seeking membership in the EU. Straight after the accession they 
wanted to establish a better negotiating position within the EU political structures and meanwhile 
enhance their close relationship with the United States. For the V4 countries, a stronger position 
within the EU has a direct influence on their position in NATO, and vice versa. However, EU 
membership connotes economic prosperity and civilization advance, while NATO as has be 
emphasized, indicates better perspectives for security conditions in the region. Therefore, V4 
countries’ performance within the ISAF mission influences their position within NATO and future 
Alliance policy agenda in the XXI-century. Therefore V4 countries could not afford a free-riding 
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performance which might seriously weaken their reliability and exclude them from NATO leaders’ 
decision-making process. Not to mention that CEC’s performance on Afghan soil has direct 
implications for their relations with the United States and the so-called special relationship between 
Washington and this particular area of the world. However, entering into the second decade of the 
XXI century, Poland and Central European countries started assessing the meetings through the 
prism of particular agreements and their final positive outcomes for the national interest. In the 
process it was determined that investment of troops and money did not translate into a change of 
relations with the USA in particularly sensitive areas, as expected by Central European governments 
The new generation of Central European citizens and politicians do not seem to be anti-American, 
but there is a growing sense that V4 countries, especially Poland, went too far in supporting 
Washington’s foreign policy. The major reason for the reassessment of the Polish – American 
relationship is Warsaw’s heightened self-reliance as a member of the European Union, and 
awareness that now the most pivotal issues are negotiated in Brussels. Another explanation is that 
Warsaw is mindful that being one of the most devoted US allies in Europe has brought more 
disadvantages than advantages. Poland incensed its major European allies when it decided to take an 
active part in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but the mission in and of itself – where the Poles were in 
command and responsible for a whole province – brought, in addition to military experience, several 
economic and diplomatic gains.341 Therefore at the end of 2007, Warsaw decided to withdraw Polish 
Armed Forces from Iraq by the end of October 2008. Central European countries also expected 
visible benefits from their participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. One of the indirect 
benefits expected by Poland together with the Czech Republic was the missile defense system which 
was supposed to be located on their territories. However, when President Obama did not participate 
in the 70th anniversary of the start of Second World War and uncovered his new agenda for the 
European missile defense system and abandoned the existing plan of predecessor, Central European 
countries took for granted that this decision had something to do with Russia and the United States 
had conceded to Moscow’s demands.  
However, the American shift in foreign policy approach has not resulted in the considerable 
improvement of relations between Washington and Moscow. According to Andrew Michta, the 
concerns of Central European countries that Moscow will become a partner of Washington were 
unfounded. In America, Russia is regarded as a difficult partner that hinders U.S. global politics; 
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therefore they have to agree to procedures between themselves, but not at the expense of relations 
with Central European countries. The so called “reset” of American-Russian relations was a useful 
political step, and would not have brought so much fear, it had been done differently. The way how 
the American administration announced a shift in missile defense program was clumsy. Central 
European countries felt that the Americans are talking with Russia without consulting them.342 
 
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central European countries have learned a lot and undergone 
a successful transformation process. When President Obama prioritized its foreign policy activities 
and wanted to work with strong and capable partners, he found them in Central Europe. At present 
Central European countries are important members of the European Union and NATO and they do 
not require from Washington special treatment and nurturing projects directed at them. According 
to Jeffrey Lightfoot, an assistant director of the International Security Program at the Atlantic 
Council, the “normalization” of the relationship between the Washington and particular countries of 
Central-Eastern European countries, and the whole region as a whole, is a far-reaching heritage of 
double cadency in the Presidency of George W. Bush. Notwithstanding Bush’s reputation across the 
European continent, his wide ranging agenda and focus on the countries of East-Central Europe 
strengthened their stature, increased their capabilities, and promoted them to more equal 
relationship status in Europe and within the transatlantic Alliance.343 
 
However, the new Obama administration, certainly in the first phase, made missteps toward the 
Central European region. The V4 countries, and Poland, are especially sensitive to historical questions 
and Obama had to reassure the new NATO allies who have been betrayed too many times in their 
long history. The recent visit of Obama in Poland was aimed to wipe out his administration’s mistakes 
toward faithful allies in East-Central Europe. Obama wanted to win over the Central European 
countries to the wider plan of American foreign policy approach by creating a network of institutions 
and capitals cooperating with the United States. Warsaw, and other East-Central European capitals, 
are seen as increasingly important players within the European Union.344 However, it seems that 
Americans should also slowly get used to the inevitable day when Poland and other Central European 
countries will oppose Washington’s political, economic or military projects. And it will not be 
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associated to Central European resentment towards Washington’s foreign policy, but a sign of the 





























Chappel, Garreth. What Future for ‘Out-Of-Area’ Operations after Afghanistan ? (Warsaw: The Polish 
Institute of International Affairs, Policy Paper, no. 4, March 2011). 
Chollet, Derek., James Goldgeier. America Between the Wars. From 11/9 to 9/11. The Misunderstood 
Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror. (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2008). 
Dorronsoro, Gilles. Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War (Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2009). 
Credible Deterrence for NATO in the XXI Century. Report from the Experts Roundtable. (Warsaw: Arms 
Control Association, British American Security Information Council, Institute for Peace Research and 
Security Policy Hamburg, Polish Institute of International Affairs with Support of William and Flora 
Hewlett Foundation, 5-6 July 2010).  
Exum, Andrew. Leverage: Designing a Political Campaign for Afghanistan. (Washington, D.C.: Center 
for a New American Security, May 2010).  
Górka-Winter, Beata and Marek Madej. Nato Member States and the New Strategic Concept: An 
Overview. (Warsaw: The Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs, May 2010).  
Hillison, John R. New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers ? (United States: Strategic 
Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 22 April 2009). 
Hofbauer, Joachim and Roy Levy, Gregory Sanders, Matthew Zlatnik. European Defense Trends. 
Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base (Washington: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, May 2010). 
Hołdak Katarzyna, Anna Komarzewska. Afganistan, Irak, Czad – Co Mamy z Misji ? Bilans Zysków i 
Strat. Perspektywy. (Warszawa: Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, I-
II,2008/7-8). 
Kamiński, Antoni Z., ed. Polityka Bez Strategii. Bezpieczeństwo Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej i Polski 
w Perspektywie Ładu Globalnego. (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 
2008). 
Kiss, Laszlo J. Central Europe: ‘Imagined Spaces’ and Challenges of the 21st Century. (Foreign Policy 
Review, Vol. 7, 2010).  
Korski, Daniel. Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge. (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 
Policy Brief, March 2009).  
   
 
111 
Kuźniar, Roman. Polityka i Siła. Studia Strategiczne – Zarys Problematyki. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Scholar, 2005).  
Lord, Kristin M. and Marc Lynch. America’s Extended Hand. Assessing the Obama Administration’s 
Global Engagement Strategy. (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, June 2010). 
Lynch, Mark. Rhetoric and Reality. Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama. (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for a New American Security, June 2010).  
Mastriano, Douglas V. Faust and the Padshah Sphinx: Reshaping the NATO Alliance to Win in 
Afghanistan. (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College,  2010).  
McCormick, James M. American Foreign Policy and Process. Fourth Edition. (Iowa State University: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2005). 
Mead, Walter, Russell. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World. 
(New York: Routledge, 2002). 
Morelli, Vincent and Paul Belkin. NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance. 
(Washington: Congressional Research Institute, 3 December 2009). 
Noetzel, Timo and Scheipers, Sibylle. Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-sharing or Disunity ? 
(London: Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, October 2007). 
Owens, Mackubin T. The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire. (Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, Winter 2009). 
Peterson, James W. and Terry Hallmark. The New NATO Members and the Mission in Afghanistan: 
Political and Economic Risks. (New Orleans: Paper Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the 
Southern Political Science Associations, 11 January 2008). 
Rotfeld, Adam Daniel ed. NATO 2020. Zapewnione Bezpieczeństwo, Dynamiczne Zaangażowanie. 
(Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2010). 
Sanger, E. David. The Inheritance. The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American 
Power. (New York: Harmony Books, 2009). 
Singh, Robert. “The Bush Doctrine,” in, The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global 
Responses, Global Consequences. Mary, Buckley., Robert, Singh., editors. (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 12-32. 
   
 
112 
Światowa Opinia Publiczna o Polityce Stanów Zjednoczonych i Operacji NATO w Afganistanie. 
(Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, lipiec 2009).  
Tokarski, Jan. ‘Zmiana’ bez zmiany (Warszawa: Centrum Europejskie Natolin. Analizy Natolińskie, 9 
(32) 2008). 
Transatlantic Trends 2009: Kluczowe wyniki 2009. (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 
2009). 
Transatlantic Trends 2011: Raport 2011. (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011). 
Trzpil, Magdalena. Afganistan jako Największe Współczesne Wyzwanie dla NATO. (Warszawa: Biuro 
Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, III-2009/11).  
„We Are a Country Awakened to Danger and Called to Defend Freedom”, The Text of President 
George W. Bush’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress Concerning the Sept. 11, 2001 Terrorists 
Attacks on America, (The Archives of Global Change in the 21st Century) 
http://www.september11news.com/PresidentBushSpeech.htm 
Winid, Bogusław. Udział Polski w Działaniach Stabilizacyjnych. (Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych, Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, nr 1 (35), 15 stycznia 2007). 
 
Internet Articles: 
Banusewicz, John D. “Lynn Thanks Czech Republic for Afghan Help”. Prague: U.S. Department of 
Defense, American Forces Press Service, June 15, 2011. 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64333 
Baranowski, Michał. „Polacy Nie Chcą Wybierać Między Ameryką a Europą”. Rzeczpospolita, 
14.09.2011, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/9157,717188-Euroentuzjazm-i-sympatia-do-USA---German-
Marshall-Fund-.html 
Bobiński, Krzysztof. „Poland’s European Infusion”. Open Democracy, July 13, 2011, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/krzysztof-bobinski/poland’s-european-infusion 
Cienski, Jan. “The Decline of America and Poland’s Special Relationship”. Warsaw: Global Post, 
September 10, 2009, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/poland/090909/poland-usa-foreign-
policy 
Conley, Heather A. “President Obama’s Return to Prague: An Opportunity to Reset”. Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, April 5, 2010, http://csis.org/publication/president-obama’s-
return-prague-opportunity-reset 
   
 
113 
Day, Matthew. “Czech Troops’ Abandoned British Soldiers’ in Afghanistan”. Warsaw: The Telegraph, 
April 22, 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/czechrepublic/5200990/Czech-troops-
abandoned-British-soldiers-in-Afghanistan.html 








Isherwood, Julian. “Denmark Tops Afghan per Capita KIA Figures”. Copenhagen: Politiken, 16 
February 2009, http://politiken.dk/newsinenglish/ECE650209/denmark-tops-afghan-per-capita-kia-
figures/ 
Lightfoot, Jeff. “America’s New Partnership with Central Europe”. Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council, 
November 6, 2009, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/americas-new-partnership-central-europe 
Jozwiak, Rikard. “EU’s Largest New Member, Poland, Takes Over Presidency”. Brussels/Warsaw: 
Radio Free Europe, June 30, 2011, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/eu_largest_new_member_poland_takes_over_presidency/24251314.
html 
Machnikowski, Ryszard. „Globalny Terroryzm a Sprawa Polska”. Warszawa: Stosunki 
Międzynarodowe, 11 Września 2011, http://www.stosunki.pl/?q=content/globalny-terroryzm-
sprawa-polska 
Motlagh, Jason. “For U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, Coalition Forces Are Mixed Blessing”. Ghazni: Time 
World, December 08, 2010. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2035859,00.html 
PAP. „Dowódca ISAF: ‘Polscy Żołnierze Imponują Odwagą’”. Wirtualna Polska. 20.12. 2010, 
http://konflikty.wp.pl/kat,1020347,title,Dowodca-ISAF-polscy-zolnierze-imponuja-
odwaga,wid,12963184,wiadomosc.html 
PAP. „Ile Kosztuje polaków Wojna w Afganistanie?” Wirtualna Polska, 23.12.2010, 
http://konflikty.wp.pl/kat,1020347,title,Ile-kosztuje-Polakow-wojna-w-
Afganistanie,wid,12976680,wiadomosc.html  
PAP. „‘Time’ Krytykuje Polskich Żołnierzy - NATO ich chwali”. Wirtualna Polska, 21.12.2010, 
http://konflikty.wp.pl/kat,1356,title,Time-krytykuje-polskich-zolnierzy-NATO-ich-
chwali,wid,12967721,wiadomosc.html 
   
 
114 




“Polish President Kaczyński Dies in Plane Crash”. BBC News, 10 April 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8612825.stm 
Pothier, Fabrice. “Europe: Loosing and at a Loss ?” Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Op-Eds, Articles, November 9, 2009, http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=24115  
Radu, Michael. “Old Europe vs. New”. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-notes, March 
12, 2003, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030312.radu.oldeuropevsnew.html 
Smoczyński, Wawrzyniec. „Rozmowa z Politologiem Andrew Michtą: Wiosłujcie z Nami”. Polityka.pl, 
25 Maj 2011, http://www.polityka.pl/swiat/rozmowy/1516206,1,rozmowa-z-politologiem-andrew-
michta.read 
Szabo Bela. “Increasing Role”. Hungarian Defense, January 18, 2011, 
http://www.hungariandefence.com/cikk/23875/increasing-role 
Wagner, Peter. “The Background of the Hungarian Activities in Baghlan”. Hungarian Institute of 
Foreign Affairs, Policy Brief, February 15, 2010, 
http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/pub/displ.asp?id=NBWWAE  
WBS. „Polacy Przeciw Misji w Afganistanie”. Warszawa: Gazeta Wyborcza.pl, 01.12.2010, 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,8746447,Polacy_przeciw_misji_w_Afganistanie.html 
Zawadzki, Mariusz. „Początek Końca Wojny”. Waszyngton: Gazeta Wyborcza.pl, 23.06.2011, 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,112353,9831394,Poczatek_konca_wojny.html 
  
Additional Sources: Internet Websites 
Afganistan Conflict Monitor, Human Security Report Project - 
http://www.conflictmonitors.org/countries/afghanistan/daily-briefing/ 
Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force Website - http://www.isaf.nato.int/ 
Central Intelligence Agency Website – The World Factbook -
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
Embassy of the United States Bratislava: Slovakia - http://slovakia.usembassy.gov/  
Ministry of Defense & Armed Forces of the Czech Republic Website - http://www.army.cz/en/  
   
 
115 
Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic Website - http://www.mod.gov.sk/  
Ministry of Hungarian Foreign Affairs Website - http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal  
Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan Website - http://www.isaf.wp.mil.pl/pl/15.html  
Visegrad Group Website - http://www.visegrad.info/ 
United States Central Command Website -  http://www.centcom.mil/  
U.S. Department of Defense Website -http://www.defense.gov/  
Human Security Report Project: Afghanistan Conflict Monitor - http://www.conflictmonitors.org/  
 
